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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Brazilian flag, whose motto was inspired by nineteenth century 
positivism, trumpets “Order and Progress.” One of the main pillars 
supporting order in a democratic society is an efficient judiciary. The 
Supreme Federal Court (SFC) of Brazil faces a challenge nowadays. The 
eleven-Justice Supreme Federal Court has been increasingly encumbered 
by an accumulation of processes: in 2001 alone, 110,771 appeals were 
presented before the Court, of which 109,692 were decided.1 Those 
appeals represented a 660% increase when compared to the 14,366 cases 
decided in 1991.2 In 2002, there were 160,453 appeals filed with the SFC, 
and 83,097 judgments were rendered.3 In his article, The Judiciary 
Reform, published in 1975, when the number of cases reached 8,775, the 
late Justice Baleeiro was already commenting on the alarming growth of 
cases addressed to the SFC, emphasizing the import of its predicament.4 
The increase in cases may be seen as resulting from the proliferation of 
provisional measures issued by the President of the Republic, the several 
controversial economic plans issued by the government, or Brazil’s steep 
population growth. However, I believe the main cause to lie within the 
structure of Brazil’s decentralized judicial review. The Brazilian 
decentralized model, although inspired by the American model, lacks a 
principle comparable to vertical stare decisis, in which the decisions of the 
SFC would be considered binding to lower courts. After the Brazilian SFC 
delivers its decision on a constitutional controversy in a lower court case, 
it has to re-analyze each individual lawsuit arising from the same 
constitutional controversy. Consequently, the SFC repeats its efforts in 
analyzing cases whose solution has already been delivered. Beyond 
elongating the judicial process, this situation puts the court in a dilemma. 
 1. Banco Nacional de Dados do Poder Judiciário, STF, Movimento Processual nos Anos de 
1940 a 2004 [National Database of the Judicial Power, SFC, Procedural Movement in the Years of 
1940 to 2004], available at http://www.stf.gov.br/bndpj/stf/MovProcessos.asp (last visited Feb. 3, 
2006). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Aliomar Baleeiro, A Reforma do Judiciário [The Judiciary Reform], 241 DIGESTO ECON. 67 
(1975). 
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Either the SFC prioritizes the speed of its judgments, or the quality of its 
decisions.5 
Reforming the decentralized judicial review of Brazilian courts is 
necessary to deflate the number of cases brought before the SFC and to 
make the judiciary system more productive. Constitutional Amendment 
45, enacted in December 2004, introduced several modifications to the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Federal Court.6 It endowed the 
pronouncements of the Súmula of the Predominant Jurisprudence of the 
Supreme Federal Court7 with binding force, by establishing the 
mechanism of Súmula Vinculante.8 The American doctrine of stare decisis 
has broader implications since it requires new cases to present identical 
facts and circumstances in order to apply the same holding to future 
cases.9 However, the principle of stare decisis could not be fully 
implemented in Brazil, since case law analysis would not be a realistic 
proposal in a civil law country and would demand a complete change in 
the system, with repercussions even in how law is taught in law schools.  
One criticism of the binding effect is that in civil law systems each 
judge must maintain their independence to decree the unconstitutionality 
of a given law. However, independence should denote autonomy and 
uninfluenced judicial power headed by the SFC, not, in my opinion, 
uncontrolled enfranchisement of each individual judge on controversies 
already adjudicated by the SFC. If judges were bound by the SFC’s 
rulings, discrepant verdicts would be avoided, making the system more 
efficient. Moreover, the inconsistency of constitutional law decisions 
issued from the numerous lower court judges causes grave perplexity, 
threatening both the efficacy and credibility of the Brazilian judiciary.  
This Article defends giving the SFC power to issue provisional 
measures to stay the proceedings of identical cases in lower courts when 
the constitutional controversy has already been presented before the SFC. 
These provisional measures should be applied when numerous individual 
cases point to the same constitutional issue, commonly known as “mass 
cases.” This measure would prevent the SFC from receiving thousands of 
 5. Justice Maurício Corrêa, Speech at his Inauguration as President of the SFC (June 5, 2003), 
available at http://www.stf.gov.br/noticias/imprensa/palavra_dos_ministras/discursos.asp (last visited 
Feb. 3, 2006). 
 6. Constituição Federal (C.F.) amend. 45 (Braz. 1988). 
 7. Miyuki Sato, Judicial Review in Brazil, Nominal and Real, 3 GLOBAL JURIST ADVANCES 1, 
arts. 4, 5 n.26 (2003). The purpose of the Súmula is to reiterate the rulings of the Supreme Federal 
Court on the most controversial questions over which the Court has already taken a firm position. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See generally KARL LLEWELLYN, COMMON LAND TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960). 
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similar cases, which congest the docket and do not contribute to the final 
decision, as will be shown in this Article.  
Following from the expanding global influence of the European 
centralized model of judicial review, a growing number of Brazilian critics 
suggested eradicating the American model of decentralized judicial review 
from Brazil in favor of the adoption of a single organ authorized to rule on 
constitutional matters, such as the Federal Constitutional Court in 
Germany.10 The European constitutional court model centralizes all cases 
pertaining to the constitutionality of existing laws, freeing the other courts 
from this duty and further specializing the function of constitutional 
adjudication.11 
Another solution to the overload of processes at the SFC is the 
implementation of a review on “writ of certiorari,” which “is not a matter 
of right, but of judicial discretion.”12 Such a device would confer 
discretionary power to the SFC to refuse jurisdiction toward unimportant 
or non-meritorious cases. Moreover, it would therefore limit its caseload, 
since the selection of cases would not require justification, nor would it 
admit any appeal.13 
Further solutions to the Brazilian SFC’s overload may be as cogent as, 
or even more efficient than, the implementation of the binding effect, the 
inclusion of stay of proceedings of extraordinary appeals, the adoption of 
the European model, or the application of the writ of certiorari. The 
comparison of judicial structures within constitutional courts 
internationally will disclose their degree of efficiency, as well as their 
impacts on democratic societies, suggesting the most appropriate solution 
to reform the Brazilian judicial review. By “efficiency” I mean a steadfast 
and expeditious justice, which is paramount to stability and legal certainty. 
 10. Ronald Rebello de Brito Polletti, Corte Constitucional Brasileira [Brazilian Constitutional 
Court], available at http://www.unb.br/fd/colunas_Prof/ronaldo_poletti/poletti_18.htm (last visited 
Feb. 3, 2006); Paulo San Martin, Presidente do STJ Pede Corte Constitucional [President of the STJ 
asks for Constitutional Court], AGENCIA ESTADO, Dec. 17, 2001, available at http://www.estadao. 
com.br/agestado/noticias/2001/set/17/280.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2006); [Advogados Aprovam 
Criação de Corte Constitutional Court], REVISTA CONSULTOR JURÍDICO, Nov. 15, 2002; OAB Apóio 
Sugestão de Mudança no Perfil do STF [OAB Supports Suggestions of Profile Change of the SFC], 
REVISTA CONSULTOR JURÍDICO, Sept. 18, 2001, available at http://uol.com.br/ (last visited Feb. 3, 
2006). 
 11. See infra Part III.B. 
 12. SUP. CT. R. 10. 
 13. Id. As a matter of fact, a similar procedure was adopted in 1975 by the Federal Supreme 
Court, which required a federal relevance question for the admissibility of extraordinary appeals. 
Regimento Interno do Supremo Tribuno Federal (R.I.S.T.F.) amend. 3 (1975). However, it was 
revoked by the Federal Constitution of 1988. See C.F. art. 102. This mechanism will be better 
explained at Part VI of this Article. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol5/iss1/5
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Judicial reform is necessary to allow the SFC to decide the fundamental 
constitutional issues of Brazil, returning the SFC to its cardinal role as the 
sanctuary of the Constitution and as the safeguard of democracy.  
This Article will focus on different models of judicial review among 
the main constitutional models in the world to formulate proposals to ease 
the burden and the overload of the Brazilian SFC. It will first present the 
historical antecedents of the Brazilian SFC, up to the present jurisdiction, 
structure, and procedures. A brief description will explain judicial review 
in the United States, Austria, Germany, Italy and France, showing 
statistics of the caseload of each highest body in charge of constitutional 
adjudication in these countries. This Article will then provide an 
explanation of the current political situation in Brazil and discuss why this 
is the right time to implement judicial reform. The newly-enacted 
Constitutional Amendment 45, which promoted several changes in the 
Brazilian SFC, will be criticized. Finally, this Article will confront the 
models of constitutional adjudication and propose the best alternatives for 
reforming the Brazilian SFC. 
II. DEFINITION OF BRAZILIAN SUPREME FEDERAL COURT’S JURISDICTION 
A. History of the Brazilian Model 
To understand the Brazilian mixed system of constitutional 
adjudication, it is necessary to understand its most important historical 
antecedents of both decentralized and centralized judicial review.  
After the independence of Brazil from Portugal in 1822, the Brazilian 
Emperor, Dom Pedro I, enacted the first Brazilian Constitution in 1824 
(1824 Imperial Constitution), which established a monarchical 
government with four political powers: the legislative, the executive, the 
judiciary power and the moderator power exercised by the Emperor 
himself.14 The 1824 Imperial Constitution established the “Supreme Court 
 14. Constituição Politica do Império do Brasil (C.POL.) art. 98 (Braz. 1824). Article 98 of the 
Political Constitution of the Empire of Brazil (Mar. 25, 1824) provides that “the Moderator Power is 
the key of all political organization, and it is delegated exclusively to the Emperor, the Supreme Chief 
of the Nation and its First Representative, in order to guard incessantly the maintenance of the 
Independence, equilibrium and harmony of the other Political Powers.” Id. The Moderator Power was 
inspired by the political doctrine of Henri-Benjamin Constant de Rebecque (1767–1830), who 
distinguished five different powers: royal power, executive power, representative power of long 
duration (hereditary assembly), representative power of public opinion (elective assembly), and 
judicial power. According to him, the royal power “is in the middle, yet above the four others, a 
superior and at the same time intermediate authority, with no interest in disturbing the balance, but on 
the contrary, with a strong interest in maintaining it.” BENJAMIN CONSTANT, POLITICAL WRITINGS 
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of Justice,”15 which was regulated by the Imperial Law of September 18, 
1828, and functioned as an appellate court from the provincial courts, 
without power to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional.16 It was 
composed of judges nominated from the provincial courts by seniority, 
with the competence to grant or deny appeals in cases as the law disposes 
and to judge crimes and mistakes of office committed by their judges, the 
provincial courts, diplomats and provincial presidents.17 Therefore, the 
determination of the constitutionality of laws was done by the Congress 
itself and the Emperor was the key for political organization, safeguarding 
the independence, balance and harmony among the powers of the nation.18 
Later on, the influence of judicial review, as established by the U.S. 
Supreme Court, was already felt in Brazilian territory. In July 1889, the 
second and last Emperor of Brazil, Dom Pedro II, told two officials who were 
going to a mission in the United States: 
Carefully study the organization of the Supreme Court of Justice of 
Washington. It seems to me that the secret of the good functioning 
of the North American Constitution lies in the functions of its 
Supreme Court. . . . Things here are not well, and I believe that if 
we could create a tribunal like the North American one and confer 
to it the attributions of the moderator power of our Constitution, the 
latter would benefit. Give maximum attention to this point.19 
184–85 (Biancamaria Fontana trans., 1988). He asserted that 
the Royal power (I mean the power of the head of the state, whatever title he happens to bear) 
is a neutral power. That of the ministers instead is an active power. In order to explain this 
difference, let us define political powers as they have been know thus far. The executive, 
legislative and judicial powers are three competences which must cooperate, each in their 
own sphere, in the general movement. When these competences, disturbed in their functions, 
cross, clash with and hinder one another, you need a power which can restore them to their 
proper place. This force cannot reside within one of these three competences, lest it should 
assist it in destroying the others. It must be external to it, and it must be in some sense neutral, 
so that its action might be necessarily applied whenever it is genuinely needed, and so that it 
may preserve and restore without being hostile. Constitutional monarchy creates this neutral 
power in the person of the head of state. The true interest of the head of state is not that any of 
these powers should overthrow the others, but that all of them should support and understand 
one another and act in concert. Until now, three powers only have been identified in political 
organizations. 
Id. 
 15. C.POL. arts. 163–164. 
 16. LENINE NEQUETE, O PODER JUDICIARIO NO BRASIL A PARTIR DA INDEPENDENCIA, VOL. I–
IMPERIO [THE JUDICIAL POWER IN BRAZIL SINCE INDEPENDENCE, VOL. I–EMPIRE] 41–42 (Cidade 
Grafica e ed., 2000). 
 17. C.POL. art. 164. 
 18. Id. art. 98. 
 19. LÊDA BOECHAT RODRIGUES, HISTÓRIA DO SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL VOL. II [HISTORY 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol5/iss1/5
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Accordingly, with the fall of the monarchy in November 1889, the 
influence of American legal culture was evident in the 1891 Republican 
Constitution.20 Federalism replaced the unitary system and the Supreme 
Court of Justice was transformed into the SFC with explicit competence 
for judicial review. Article 59, section 1 of the 1891 Republican 
Constitution provided that there would be a right to appeal to the SFC 
against state justice decisions whenever the validity of treaties and federal 
statues were argued or whenever the validity of statutes or acts of state 
governments upon the Constitution were contested.21 Indeed, the 1891 
Republican Constitution of Brazil recognized the constitutional 
adjudication of the judiciary, with the SFC as the highest organ.22 
Albeit inspired by the North American decentralized judicial review, 
the Brazilian decentralized system has not implemented either stare 
decisis or the writ of certiorari. Due to Brazilian Romanist tradition, the 
binding force of a precedent is considered to be counter to the legal culture 
of independence of the judiciary, and the selection of cases by the SFC is 
seen as a restriction of subjective rights. Therefore, any party has the right 
to appeal to the SFC if there is a constitutional controversy involved in the 
case. As a result, the constitutional borrowing of the North American 
system was implemented without the pivotal elements to regulate and 
coordinate the decentralized system of judicial review.  
In 1975, the ever-increasing number of cases arriving at the SFC led to 
the creation of a mechanism inspired by the writ of certiorari: the requisite 
of a federal issue.23 This device was designed to limit the number of 
“extraordinary appeals”24 before the SFC by allowing the SFC to decide, 
in secret session and without providing reasons, which cases were 
considered relevant to be judged.25 With the Constitution of 1988, which 
created the Superior Court of Justice with jurisdiction on federal law 
matters, this mechanism was abolished as it was deemed unnecessary 
because the SFC’s extraordinary appellate jurisdiction was reduced to 
constitutional questions only.26 
OF THE FEDERAL SUPREME TRIBUNAL] 1 (Civilização Brasileira ed., 1991). 
 20. Repub. Const. Braz. (1891). 
 21. Id. art. 59, § 1. 
 22. Id. art. 59, § 1, b. 
 23. R.I.S.T.F. amend. 3. 
 24. In Portuguese, it is called “recurso extraordinário.” 
 25. R.I.S.T.F. amend. 3. 
 26. C.F. art. 102. 
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The first signs of the implementation of a centralized judicial review 
model in Brazil appeared in 1934.27 However, centralized judicial review 
became significant only in 1965 when the Writ of Representation of 
Unconstitutionality was included in the original jurisdiction of the SFC.28 
This writ, the standing of which was exclusive to the Attorney General of 
the Republic, was designed to challenge federal and state normative acts in 
abstract before the Federal Constitution. In other words, there were no 
parties and no actual conflict involved in the controversy. Each state could 
establish an action to challenge municipal statutes in conflict with the state 
constitution, as original jurisdiction of the respective state court of 
appeals.29 
With the supervening and present Federal Constitution of 1988, 
standing for the centralized judicial review before the SFC was broadened. 
The above mentioned Writ of Representation of Unconstitutionality was 
replaced by a writ named Direct Action of Unconstitutionality, which is 
also an action by which one can raise the unconstitutionality of a statute 
directly before the SFC, without actual injury by an enforcement of the 
legislation.30 The main difference between these two writs is that the latter 
enlarges the number of potential petitioners, whereas the former was 
exclusive to the Attorney-General of the Republic.31 A Direct Action of 
Unconstitutionality can be filed before the SFC by: the President of the 
Republic; the Directing Board of the Federal Senate; the Directing Board 
of the Chamber of Deputies; the Directing Board of a State Legislative 
Assembly; a State Governor; the Attorney General of the Republic; the 
Federal Council of the Brazilian Bar Association; a political party 
represented in the National Congress; a confederation of labor unions; or, 
a professional association of a nationwide nature.32 Indeed, this writ not 
only permits the government but also private entities to challenge 
 27. See Constituição (C.) (Braz. 1934). The Constitution of 1934 allowed states to have their own 
constitutions and statutes, which would have to observe some constitutional principles. Id. In case 
states enacted legislation that violated the Federal Constitution, the Attorney General was allowed to 
file a “representation for federal intervention” before the SFC, seeking a declaration of the 
unconstitutionality of that normative act. See RONALDO POLLETTI, CONTROLE DE 
CONSTITUCIONALIDADE DAS LEIS [THE CONTROL OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LAWS] 80–81 (Forense 
1995). 
 28. C. amend. 16 (Braz. 1946) (changing article 101 (I) (k) and article 124 (XIII)). 
 29. Id. 
 30. C.F. art. 103. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
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legislation before the SFC, thus democratizing the access to the centralized 
judicial review.33 
Following the expansion of centralized judicial review, the Third 
Amendment to the Federal Constitution of 1988 created a Declaratory 
Action of Constitutionality, by which final decisions on the merits 
pronounced by the SFC are given force and binding effect, with regard to 
all other bodies of the Judicial Power, as well as the Executive Power.34 
This writ differs from the Direct Action of Unconstitutionality in that it 
aims to confirm the constitutional validity of a federal statute, as opposed 
to seeking a declaration of its unconstitutionality. Given the presumption 
of the constitutionality of legislation, as well as its binding effect, this writ 
was sharply criticized because it originally allowed the government, 
whose officials had exclusive standing for this writ, to submit the question 
of the constitutionality of a statute directly to the SFC when there was 
evidence of the existence of substantive judicial controversy over the 
legitimacy of a statute, therefore preventing the reflection of lower court’s 
judges on the question.35 It was also criticized because of its binding 
effect. However, this writ is used only in extreme cases of national 
controversy over a normative act, and is a very important mechanism to 
avoid thousands of lawsuits, diverse judicial rulings, overburdening of the 
judiciary and perplexity in the population. As a matter of fact, only nine 
Declaratory Actions of Unconstitutionality were filed before the SFC since 
its creation in 1993, which proves the caution of the government in filing 
this kind of suit, as well as the strong requirement of admissibility 
imposed by the SFC.36 In December 2004, however, this difference was 
conciliated by Constitutional Amendment 45, which, among other changes 
shown below, expands the list of legitimate petitioners of a Declaratory 
Action of Constitutionality and confers binding effect to Direct Actions of 
Unconstitutionality.37 
 33. Id. 
 34. Originally C.F. amendment 3, which inserted paragraph 4 in article 103. In 2004, C.F. 
amendment 45 inserted the declaratory action of constitutionality in article 103, and revoked paragraph 
4. 
 35. As originally prescribed in C.F. amendment 3, only the following government bodies were 
legitimate to file a declaratory action of constitutionality: the President of the Republic, the Directing 
Board of the Federal Senate, the Directing Board of the Chamber of Deputies and the Attorney 
General of the Republic.  
 36. As mentioned before, this kind of action requires evidence of the existence of judicial dissent 
in relevant proportions on the national level. The SFC is very strict with this requirement. Otherwise, it 
would become a consultancy organ, which would be incompatible with its jurisdictional function. 
Banco Nacional de Dados do Poder Judiciário [National Database of the Judiciary Power], available at 
http://www.stf.gov.br/bndpj/stf/ADC.asp (last visited Feb. 3, 2006). 
 37. C.F. amend. 45. 
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As can be seen, the SFC combines the original jurisdiction of 
centralized judicial review and the highest jurisdiction of the decentralized 
system of constitutional adjudication. This Article will next focus on 
problems related to decentralized judicial review, which are the cause of 
the structural problems that are leading to enormous backlogs and delays 
in rendering final decisions in the Brazilian judiciary. 
B. Procedures and Present Structure of the Supreme Federal Court 
Following the American model, the judges of the SFC are appointed by 
the President of the Republic after their nomination has been approved by 
an absolute majority of the Federal Senate.38 Nonetheless, the number of 
judges is established in the Federal Constitution, preventing a legislature 
dissatisfied with a position of the SFC from passing an ordinary act 
augmenting or diminishing its composition.39 Article 102 of the Federal 
Constitution establishes the original jurisdiction of the SFC.40 
 38. C.F. art. 101. 
 39. Id. “The Supreme Federal Court is composed of eleven Justices, chosen from among citizens 
over thirty-five and under sixty-five years of age, of notable juridical learning and spotless reputation.” 
Id. 
 40. Id. art. 102. 
The Supreme Federal Court is responsible, essentially, for safeguarding the Constitution, and 
it is within its original jurisdiction to institute legal proceeding and trial, in the first instance, 
of: 
a) direct actions of unconstitutionality of a federal or state law or normative act, and 
declaratory actions of constitutionality of a federal law or normative act; 
b) in common criminal offenses, the President of the Republic, the Vice-President, the 
members of the National Congress, its own Justices and the Attorney-General of the 
Republic; 
c) in common criminal offenses and crimes of malversation, the Ministers of State, except as 
provided in article 52, I, the members of the Superior Courts, those of the Federal Court of 
Accounts and the heads of permanent diplomatic missions; 
d) habeas corpus, when the petitioner is any one of the persons referred to in the preceding 
subitems; the writ of mandamus and habeas data against acts of the President of the Republic, 
of the Directing Boards of the Chamber of Deputies and of the Federal Senate, of the Federal 
Court of Accounts, of the Attorney-General of the Republic and of the Supreme Federal 
Court itself; 
e) litigation between a foreign State or an international organization and the Union, a state, 
the Federal District or a territory; 
f) disputes and conflicts between the Union and the states, the Union and the Federal District, 
or between one another, including the respective indirect administration bodies; 
g) extradition requested by a foreign state; 
h) revoked by C.F. amend. 45; 
i) habeas corpus, when the constraining party or the petitioner is a court, authority or 
employee whose acts are directly subject to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Federal Court, or 
in the case of a crime, subject to the same jurisdiction in one sole instance; 
j) criminal review of and rescissory action against its decisions;  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol5/iss1/5
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Additionally, the SFC hears, by ordinary appeal, cases dealing with 
political crimes. The SFC also hears, by habeas corpus, writs of 
mandamus, habeas data and writs of injunction decided in a sole instance 
by the Superior Courts in the event of a denial. Moreover, a claim of non-
compliance with a fundamental precept derived from the Federal 
Constitution can be examined by the SFC under the terms of the law.41 
This extensive list might suggest that the original and appellate 
jurisdiction of the SFC is quite broad; however, it is manageable and 
original jurisdiction is not the cause of the case overload of the Court, as 
will be shown.  
The main source of the monstrous number of cases that reach the SFC 
is its extraordinary appellate jurisdiction. Currently, the SFC has 
jurisdiction to judge, on extraordinary appeal, cases decided in a sole or 
last instance, when the decision appealed: a) is contrary to a provision of 
the Constitution;42 b) declares a treaty or a federal law unconstitutional;43 
c) considers valid a law or act of a local government contested in the light 
of the Constitution;44 d) considers valid a local law contested in the light 
of a federal law.45 Moreover, one must keep in mind that the Brazilian 
Federal Constitution, like many modern constitutions, is very broad, not 
only controlling the political government and its organization, but also 
ensuring extensive fundamental guarantees and social rights, as well as 
l) claims for the preservation of its powers and guarantee of the authority of its decisions; 
m) enforcement of court decisions in the cases where it has original competence, the 
delegation of duties to perform procedural acts being allowed; 
n) a suit in which all members of the judicature are directly or indirectly involved, and a suit 
in which more than half of the members of the court of origin are disqualified or have a direct 
or indirect interest; 
o) conflicts of powers between the Superior Court of Justice and any other courts, between 
Superior Courts, or between the latter and any other court; 
p) petitions of provisional remedy in direct actions of unconstitutionality; 
q) writs of injunction, when drawing up of the regulation is the responsibility of the President 
of the Republic, of the National Congress, of the Chamber of Deputies, of the Federal Senate, 
of the Directing Boards of one of these legislative houses, of the Federal Court of Accounts, 
of one of the Superior Courts, or of the Supreme Federal Court itself; 
r) actions against the National Council of Justice and the National Council of Public 
Prosecution. 
Id. art. 102. 
 41. The mentioned law is Federal Law 9.882/99, which is currently being challenged before the 
Federal Supreme Court in the Direct Action of Unconstitutionality 2.231-DF.  
 42. C.F. art. 102, § IIIa. 
 43. Id. § IIIb. 
 44. Id. § IIIc. 
 45. Id. § IIId. 
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organizing the principles of economic order.46 Consequently, many 
litigants evoke constitutional rights in their pleadings, which are very 
likely to end up in the SFC, since the defeated litigant will seek to reverse 
a disfavourable judgment. 
Before Constitutional Amendment 45 of December 2004, the Brazilian 
system, unlike the American counterpart, did not provide a formal 
mechanism to select which cases the SFC would hear. The procedure for 
appealing to the SFC was the following: extraordinary appeals were filed 
before the court a quo whose president analyzed their admissibility.47 If 
the president of the court a quo denied the extraordinary appeal, the 
unsuccessful appellant could file an interlocutory appeal to the SFC48 
asking for review of the denial of admissibility of the extraordinary 
appeal.49 
With Constitutional Amendment 45, a new requirement was added: the 
appellant must show the general repercussion of the constitutional 
controversy presented in his case in order to have the SFC receive the 
appeal.50 Under this new rule, however, the SFC may only refuse a case by 
a quorum of two-thirds of its Justices, and through procedures that will be 
defined by statutory law.51 
The dramatic growth of cases addressed to the SFC was already a 
preoccupation in the middle of the twentieth century. In 1963, the SFC 
created a device denominated “Súmula of the Predominant Jurisprudence 
of the Supreme Federal Court,” commonly called Súmula.52 The Súmula is 
 46. The Federal Constitution has 250 articles, divided into nine titles, which are:  
I—Fundamental Principles (articles 1–4);  
II—Fundamental Rights and Guarantees (articles 5–17);  
III—The Organization of the State (articles 18–43);  
IV—The Organization of Powers (articles 44–135);  
V—The Defense of the State and of the Democratic Institutions (articles 136–144);  
VI—Taxation and Budget (articles 145–169);  
VII—The Economic and Financial Order (articles 170–192);  
VIII—The Social Order (articles 193–232);  
IX—General Constitutional Provisions (articles 233–250). 
Id. 
 47. C.F. art. 102. 
 48. This interlocutory appeal is called “agravo de instrumento.” Keith S. Rosenn translates this 
kind of interlocutory appeal as “bill of review.” Keith S. Rosenn, Civil Procedure in Brazil, 34 AMER. 
J. COMP. L. 487, 508 (1986). 
 49. Id. 
 50. C.F. amend. 45. 
 51. Id. 
 52. The Supreme Federal Court Internal Rules [Regimento Interno do Supreme Tribunal Federal] 
state that the Plenary shall have the power to deliberate upon inclusion, alteration, and cancellation of 
enouncements of the Súmula of the Predominant Jurisprudence of the Supreme Federal Court. 
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a digest of one-sentence-pronouncements of the judgments of the Court 
that states succinctly its interpretation of rules and of the Constitution.53 
The purpose of the Súmula is to state the rulings of the SFC on the most 
controversial questions over which the Court has already taken a firm 
position repeatedly.54 
The Súmula divulges the jurisprudence of the Court in a concise and 
punctual way to the juridical community, making it easier for judges and 
lawyers to be acquainted with the decisions. This procedure also indirectly 
discourages appeals that would eventually be denied. This concept was an 
innovation conceived by then Ministry of the SFC, Victor Nunes Leal.55 It 
was considered revolutionary at that time because it established a 
compromise between the lack of the doctrine of stare decisis in the 
Brazilian system and the urgent need to expedite the proceedings before 
the Court in order to avoid delays and backlogs.56 The Súmula becomes 
particularly important considering the similarity of many of the cases that 
overwhelm the SFC. The Súmula is designed to prevent the Court from 
having to repeatedly issue similar decisions, thereby saving time in 
applying the same decision in a batch of analogous cases. The Súmula is 
also a very helpful tool for lawyers and lower court judges because each 
announcement cites the leading case and the cases that followed it. This 
disburdens the task of researching precedents to understand the arguments 
and reasoning of previous decisions.57 Even though the Súmula is not 
binding, it is persuasive and it is understood to be an instrument to 
rationalize internal proceedings and to further access to SFC 
jurisprudence.  
Despite the efforts to expedite internal proceedings with this 
mechanism, the number of cases brought before the SFC increased 
sharply, producing inevitable backlogs and jamming the docket. The 
following table illustrates the number of cases filed in several years at the 
SFC since 1940: 
R.I.S.T.F. art. 7, VII. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See Victor Nunes Leal, Passado e Futuro da Súmula do STF [Past and Future of the 
Súmula], 145 REVISTA DO DIREITO ADMINISTRATIVO 1 (1981). 
 56. Justice José Paulo Sepúlveda Pertence, Remarks at the SFC Plenary Session (Aug. 28, 2003) 
(announcements of the Súmula were discussed) (on file with author). 
 57. It is important to underline that the Súmula is an instrument for repetitive suits, many of them 
against a government measure or policy. Each announcement of the Súmula mentions a list of 
precedents decided and the legislation involved in that matter.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 99 Oliveira book pages.doc2/28/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
112 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 5:99 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1 
SUPREME FEDERAL COURT OF BRAZIL58 
Year Number  
 of filings 
Number of 
judgments 
Year Number  
of filings 
Number of 
judgments
Year Number 
of filings
Number of 
judgments 
1940 2,419 1,807 1962 7,705 7,436 1984 16,386 17,780 
1941 2,629 2,265 1963 8,216 6,881 1985 18,206 17,798 
1942 2,496 2,447 1964 8,960 7,849 1986 22,514 22,158 
1943 2,480 2,355 1965 8,456 6,241 1987 20,430 20,122 
1944 2,584 2,321 1966 7,378 9,175 1988 21,328 16,313 
1945 3,422 1,860 1967 7,614 7,879 1989 14,721 17,432 
1946 2,415 1,819 1968 8,612 9,899 1990 18,564 16,449 
1947 2,773 2,565 1969 8,023 9,954 1991 18,438 14,366 
1948 2,729 2,988 1970 6,367 6,486 1992 27,447 18,236 
1949 3,335 3,269 1971 5,921 6,407 1993 24,377 21,737 
1950 3,091 3,371 1972 6,253 6,523 1994 24,295 28,221 
1951 3,305 2,917 1973 7,093 8,049 1995 27,743 34,125 
1952 3,956 4,197 1974 7,352 7,986 1996 28,134 30,829 
1953 4,903 4,464 1975 8,775 9,083 1997 36,490 39,994 
1954 4,710 3,933 1976 6,877 7,565 1998 52,636 51,307 
1955 5,015 4,146 1977 7,072 7,947 1999 68,369 56,307 
1956 6,556 4,940 1978 8,146 8,848 2000 105,307 86,138 
1957 6,597 6,174 1979 8,277 10,051 2001 110,771 109,692 
1958 7,114 7,302 1980 9,555 9,007 2002 160,453 83,097 
1959 6,470 8,360 1981 12,494 13,371 2003 87,186 107,867 
1960 6,504 5,747 1982 13,648 15,117 2004 83,667 101,690 
1961 6,751 6,886 1983 14,668 15,260    
 
There are many possible reasons for this continuous upward trend. 
During the twentieth century, the Brazilian population increased ten–fold, 
from 17.4 million in 1901 to 170 million in 2000.59 In the last decade, the 
excessive issuance of provisional measures by the Executive aiming to 
regulate controversial subject matters that affect significant parts of 
society, as well as the release of controversial economic plans, have also 
contributed to the escalating recourse to the judiciary.60 Not rarely, the 
 
 
 58. Banco Nacional, supra note 1. 
 59. Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatísticas, Estatísticas do Século XX [Statistics of the 
20th Century] (2003), available at http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/presidencia/noticias/29092003 
estatisticasecxxhtml.shtm (last visited Feb. 3, 2006). 
 60. Article 62 of the Federal Constitution of 1988 provides that “in important and urgent cases, 
the President of the Republic may adopt provisional measures with the force of law and shall submit 
them to the National Congress immediately.” C.F. art. 62. Provisional measures have been an 
important instrument of policy and programs of the Executive in controversial issues, which have 
provoked innumerous suits.  
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Public Advocacy61 uses the appeals system to procrastinate adverse 
judicial decisions, overloading the SFC with appeals on legal issues that 
have been decided already. An emblematic case of such intentional use of 
dilatory appeals by government bodies is the dispute over the inflation 
adjustment of the Severance-Pay Fund implemented through several 
governmental economic plans designed to control inflation from 1987 to 
1991.62 This controversy raised thousands of individual lawsuits and is an 
example of what are called “mass cases” due to the number of people 
litigating the same question.63 The main question was whether the 
reduction of the indices of monetary correction applied to the Severance-
Pay Fund accounts by governmental economic plans issued to control 
inflation violated the constitutional principle of vested rights.64 The SFC 
ruled that the Severance-Pay Fund accounts did not have a contractual 
basis and therefore rejected the argument of vested rights.65 However, in 
analyzing each economic plan, the SFC partially upheld the lower court’s 
ruling that favored employees because other questions were related to 
legal matters and not constitutional issues.66 
Even after the SFC delivered the decision governing the litigation in 
August 2000, the Public Advocacy kept filing extraordinary appeals as 
well as interlocutory appeals, instead of applying the SFC ruling to its 
thousands of similar cases. As of January 2002, there were 112,365 suits 
about the mentioned subject matter out of 147,136 submitted to the SFC, 
which represented 83.16% of the docket.67 Only after such procrastinatory 
 61. The Advocacy General of the Union is the institution which, either directly or through a 
subordinated agency, represents the Union and the federal government bodies judicially or 
extrajudicially. C.F. art. 131. 
 62. Those economic plans are commonly know as Plano Bresser, Plano Verão, Plano Collor I, 
and Plano Collor II. 
 63. To better understand the facts on those “mass cases” one should have in mind that the 
accumulation of repetitive cases develops in two stages: First, as a general rule, litigation starts before 
the first instance’s judges all over the country. Then, the losing party will appeal from the decision to a 
second instance’s court (state or federal court of appeals). After that, there is a possibility of appealing 
simultaneously to the Superior Court of Justice (legal matters) and to the SFC (constitutional matters). 
By the time a controversy arrives at the SFC, lower courts have already decided countless cases on the 
subject matter and, as a result, innumerous extraordinary appeals have been already filed. Second, after 
a final decision of the SFC has been rendered on the merits of the controversy, those cases that have 
been decided in a different way by the lower courts will still have to go all the way to the SFC to be 
reversed. Worse still, some losing litigators (especially the government, as the Severance-Pay Fund 
case exemplifies) appeal to the SFC even though they already know that there is a previous decision 
against their claim just for procrastinatory purposes.  
 64. C.F. art. 5. “The law shall not injure the vested right, the perfect juridical act and the res 
judicata.” Id. 
 65. Recurso Extraordinário [Extraordinary Appeal] n. 226.855-RS, R.T.J. 174/916. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See News of the Supreme Federal Court of January 7, 2002, FGTS é o Assunto Mais 
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maneuvers were fined considerably,68 and the SFC, the General Advocacy 
of the Union and the Caixa Econômica Federal entered into an agreement 
in February 2002; did the Public Advocacy plead desistance of the appeals 
filed before the SFC and stop filing new appeals.69 There were 34,387 
requests of desistance filed in 2002, followed by 50,918 in 2003.70 This 
situation illustrates how one mass case situation may congest the SFC 
docket unnecessarily.  
In 2003, the SFC delivered 107,867 judgments,71 among which the 
extraordinary appeals totaled 43,05472 and the interlocutory appeals 
against the denial of admissibility of extraordinary appeals totaled 
55,937.73 These numbers show that 91.7% of all cases decided by the SFC 
in 2003 were related to extraordinary appellate jurisdiction, whereas the 
remaining cases contrastingly related to original jurisdiction. Indeed, the 
SFC’s statistics show the titanic endeavor Brazil’s highest judicial body 
faces daily with extraordinary appellate jurisdiction. 
The costs of setting the SFC machinery in motion for repetitive cases 
are very high. Justices should be devoting their time to analyzing crucial 
national cases instead of repeating the effort of applying the same decision 
to similar cases, regardless whether “the principle of stare decisis is 
foreign to civil law judges.”74 If a system is not working properly, it 
should be reexamined. One should not underestimate the number of 
similar cases before the SFC; each appeal has to be reviewed and analyzed 
Freqüente No Supremo Tribunal Federal [Severance-Pay Fund is the Most Frequent Subject Matter in 
the Supreme Federal Court], at http://www.stf.gov.br/noticias/imprensa/ultimas/ler.asp?CODIGO= 
17176&tip=UN. The second most frequent controversy was about the review of pension benefits, with 
15,420 lawsuits. Id. 
 68. When interlocutory appeal is manifestly inadmissible, the Code of Civil Procedure allows 
courts to condemn the appellant to pay the appellee a fine ranging from 1% to 10% of the value of the 
litigation. C.P.C. art. 557, § 3. 
 69. News of the Supreme Federal Court of February 11, 2003, STF homologa desistência da 
CEF em 33 mil processos sobre correção do FGTS [Supreme Federal Court homologates desistance 
of Caixa Econômica Federal in 33,000 suits about adjustment of the Severance-Pay Fund], at 
http://www.stf.gov.br/noticias/imprensa/ultimas/ler.asp?CODIGO=39031&tip=UN. Caixa Econômica 
Federal is the governmental bank in charge of administering the severance-pay accounts. 
 70. Banco Nacional, supra note 1. Despite the fact that this statistic does not make express 
reference to the severance-pay fund cases, I attribute the decrease of filings in 2003 to the final 
settlement of this controversy only due to the previous years’ statistics of request of desistance: fifty in 
2002, and none in 2001. Id.  
 71. Id. 
 72. Banco Nacional de Dados do Poder Judiciário, STF, Processos Registrados, Distribuidos e 
Julgados por Classe Processual [National Database of the Judicial Power, SFC, Cases Registered, 
Distributed and Judged by Procedural Class], at http://www.stf.gov.br/bndpj/stf/ClasseProc.asp (last 
visited Sept. 26, 2005). 
 73. Id.  
 74. MAURO CAPPELLETTI, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 140 (1989). 
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by the Court’s staff to see if it is the same controversy and if the 
admissibility requirements are met. Although winning litigants count on a 
favorable ruling at the SFC, they must continue litigating the dilatory 
appeals filed by the opposing parties, who take advantage of the appellate 
system’s structural malfunctioning in order to postpone compliance with 
their condemnation. Posner observes that “[t]he principal method of 
accommodating the caseload increase has been to expand the number of 
supporting personnel . . . .”75 Indeed, the SFC constantly needs to increase 
personnel to handle all of the judicial proceedings and to expand facilities, 
which consequently requires a higher budget. 
Despite the structural problems and adverse conditions within the 
judiciary, the SFC has responded to this enormous demand. It is 
accomplishing its institutional mission to safeguard the Constitution by 
using internal procedures to expedite proceedings at the court level. 
However, this structure no longer corresponds to Brazilian society’s 
needs; it is not cost-effective and, more importantly, it causes distress and 
perplexity. 
III. MODELS OF CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION 
A. Decentralized Model  
1. United States 
Judicial review was first established in the United States in 1803 by the 
famous case Marbury v. Madison,76 “in which the Supreme Court asserted 
that a federal court has power to refuse to give effect to congressional 
legislation if it is inconsistent with the court’s interpretation of the 
Constitution.”77 Laurence Tribe explains that: 
Marshall rested his defense of federal judicial review on the 
constitutionality of acts of Congress chiefly upon the following 
propositions. (1) “[A]ll those who have framed written constitutions 
contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of 
the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government 
must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, 
is void.” (2) “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to 
 75. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS CRISIS AND REFORM 97 (1985). 
 76. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 77. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 20 (1978).  
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particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If 
two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the 
operation of each . . . . If then the courts are to regard the 
constitution; and the constitution is superior to any ordinary act of 
the legislature; the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must 
govern the case to which they both apply.” (3) “Those then who 
controvert the principle that the constitution is to be considered, in 
court, as a paramount law, are reduced to the necessity of 
maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the constitution, 
and see only the law. This doctrine . . . would declare, that if the 
legislature shall do what is expressly forbidden, such act, 
notwithstanding the express prohibition, is in reality effectual. It 
would be giving to the legislature a practical and real omnipotence, 
with the same breath which professes to restrict their powers within 
narrow limits.”78 
This model of constitutional review is known as decentralized or 
diffuse due to the fact that the task of interpreting the Constitution is given 
to any court.79 It is also known as incidental, indirect, or concrete review 
because it requires that an actual litigation be brought before a court.80 
Constitutional adjudication is a very broad subject matter, so, for the 
purposes of this paper, I will focus on the institutional design and the 
efficiency of the United States Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction.  
As defined in Article III of the United States Constitution, the Supreme 
Court has appellate jurisdiction, as to law and fact, under congressional 
regulation.81 The decisions of the United States Supreme Court have 
binding effect upon lower courts.82 The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
is discretionary, and therefore the Court decides which cases it will hear.83 
 78. Id. at 21–22 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177–78). 
 79. MAURO CAPPELLETTI & WILLIAM COHEN, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 73 (1978). 
 80. MAURO CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 69–84 (1971). 
 81. U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 2. 
 82. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982) (“But unless we wish anarchy to prevail within the 
federal judicial system, a precedent of this Court must be followed by the lower federal courts no 
matter how misguided the judges of those courts may think it to be.”). 
 83. SUP. CT. R. 10. 
Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion. A petition for 
a writ of certiorari will be granted only for compelling reasons. The following, although 
neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court's discretion, indicate the character of the 
reasons the Court considers: 
(a) a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the decision of 
another United States court of appeals on the same important matter; has decided an 
important federal question in a way that conflicts with a decision by a state court of last 
resort; or has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or 
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However, the discretionary jurisdiction on constitutional appellate 
review of the United States Supreme Court has not always been the case in 
the American judicial system. To better understand the United States 
Supreme Court’s constitutional review, it is necessary to glance at its 
historical development. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the 
United States Supreme Court reviewed all appeals brought before it, but in 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s words, “such a mission became impossible for 
any one court to fulfill by the end of the nineteenth century. . . .”84 
The Judiciary Act of 1891 created the U.S. courts of appeals, which 
have jurisdiction over appeals from district and circuit courts, and 
introduced the writ of certiorari, lessening the workload of the United 
States Supreme Court.85 Nevertheless, that legislation was not enough to 
control constant growth of the caseload. Some decades later, Congress 
responded to Chief Justice Taft’s efforts to reform United States Supreme 
Court appellate jurisdiction by passing the Judiciary Act of 1925.86 This 
statute reduced the number of mandatory appeals and broadened the 
Court’s discretionary power to refuse review of lower courts’ decisions by 
writ of certiorari.87 
From then on, the most significant reform of the United States Supreme 
Court’s discretionary jurisdiction was the Supreme Court Case Selection 
Act of 1988, which eliminated all mandatory appellate jurisdiction except 
for appeals from three-judge panels.88 All of these reforms concentrated on 
reducing the docket and ensured that vital and urgent constitutional 
controversies are adjudicated in a reasonable time, avoiding costly delays 
and crushing backlogs. 
Other than entering the United States Supreme Court through direct 
appeals of decisions from three-judge district court panels granting or 
sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this Court's 
supervisory power;  
(b) a state court of last resort has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts 
with the decision of another state court of last resort or of a United States court of appeals;  
(c) a state court or a United States court of appeals has decided an important question of 
federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by this Court, or has decided an important 
federal question in a way that conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court. 
Id. 
 84. Justice William H. Rehnquist, The Changing Role of the Supreme Court, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 1, 9 (1986). 
 85. Judiciary Act of 1891, 26 Stat. 826 (1891). 
 86. Judiciary Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 415, 43 Stat. 936 (1925). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Supreme Court Case Selection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662 (1988). 
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denying an injunction,89 a case can be reviewed by the Supreme Court 
through certification.90 
Certification is a procedure in which a federal court of appeals asks the 
United States Supreme Court for instructions on a question of importance 
in a case pending before it.91 In this case, the United States Supreme Court 
may give binding instructions or require that the full record be sent up for 
decision of the entire matter in controversy.92 Certified questions are rarely 
brought before the United States Supreme Court, “it being recognized by 
the lower courts that the Supreme Court should determine which cases it 
will decide.”93  
The appellate jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court is mainly 
discretionary and is exercised through the writ of certiorari. The certiorari 
doctrine is fundamental to the decentralized model of judicial review, as it 
permits that only paramount and capital cases reach the United States 
Supreme Court. There is much controversy and political consideration 
concerning which cases the Supreme Court actually selects. As Rule 10 of 
the Supreme Court states, “review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of 
right, but of judicial discretion.”94 This rule casts light on the reasons the 
Court might consider granting certiorari, nonetheless it asseverates that 
those reasons are “neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court's 
discretion.”95 To grant a petition of certiorari, it is necessary that at least 
four Justices vote in favor.96 The Supreme Court’s decisions are taken in 
secrecy, and do not present denied petitions with any reasoning or 
explanation. The Court only states that the petition for review has been 
denied and does not give any further reason for the denial.97 In cases of 
imperative public importance, the Supreme Court may grant certiorari 
before judgment is delivered by a United States Court of Appeals, as Rule 
11 provides.98 
 89. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1976). 
 90. Id. § 1254(3). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. § 1254. 
 93. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & MICHELE TARUFFO, AMERICAN CIVIL PROCEDURE 185 (1993). 
 94. SUP. CT. R. 10 
 95. Id. 
 96. BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 2 (1979) (“At least four of the 
nine Justices must vote to hear a case.”). 
 97. SUP. CT. R. 16. 
 98. SUP. CT. R. 11. 
Certiorari to a United States Court of Appeals Before Judgment. A petition for a writ of 
certiorari to review a case pending in a United States court of appeals, before judgment is 
entered in that court, will be granted only upon a showing that the case is of such imperative 
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Many theories have been presented on the case selection criteria of the 
United States Supreme Court.99 Arthur Hellman identifies four categories 
of reasons for the grant of review: intercourt conflicts, compelling interests 
of the federal government, doubtful recurring issues, and a heterogeneous 
group of reasons.100 A group of scholars, led by Joseph Tanenhaus, 
conceived the “cue theory,”101 which suggests that the method of selection 
of certiorari petitions depends on the presence of “cues”: “(1) When the 
federal government seeks review. (2) When dissension has been indicated 
among the judges of the court immediately below, or between two or more 
courts and agencies in a given case. (3) When a civil liberties issue is 
present. (4) When an economic issue is present.”102 Perry formulates a 
public importance as to justify deviation from normal appellate practice and to require 
immediate determination in this Court. 
Id. 
 99. See generally SUSAN LOW BLOCH & THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER, SUPREME COURT 
POLITICS: THE INSTITUTION AND ITS PROCEDURES (1994); DORIS MARIE PROVINE, CASE SELECTION 
IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1980); H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE, AGENDA 
SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 7 n.10 (1991) (providing the following list of 
studies on case selection: Lawrence Baum, Decisions to Grant and Deny Hearing in the California 
Supreme Court: Patterns in Court and Individual Behaviour, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 713 (1976); 
Lawrence Baum, Policy Goals in Judicial Gatekeeping: A Proximity Model of Discretionary 
Jurisdiction, 21 AM. J. POL. SCI. 13 (1977); Lawrence Baum, Judicial Demand-Screening and 
Decision on the Merits: A Second Look, 7 AM. POL. Q. 1, 109 (1979); Saul Brenner, The New 
Certiorari Game, 41 J. POL. 649 (1979); Gregory A. Caldeira, The United States Supreme Court and 
Criminal Cases, 1935-1976: Alternative Models of Agenda Building, 11 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 449 (1981); 
Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme 
Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109 (1988); Peter Linzer, The Meaning of Certiorari Denials, 7 COL. 
L. REV. 1227 (1979); William P. McLauchlan, An Exploratory Analysis of the Supreme Court’s 
Caseload from 1880 to 1976, 64 JUD. 32 (1980); Richard L. Pacelle, Jr., The Supreme Court Agenda 
Across Time: Dynamics and Determinants of Change (1985) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio 
State University); Jan Palmer, An Econometric Analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Certiorari 
Decisions, 39 PUB. CHOICE 387–98 (1982); Glendon Schubert, The Certiorari Game, in 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 210–54 (Glendon Schubert ed., 1959); Glendon 
Schubert, Policy Without Law: An Extension of the Certiorari Game, 14 STAN. L. REV. 284 (1962); 
Donald Songer, Concern for Policy Outputs as a Cue for Supreme Court Decisions on Certiorari, 41 J. 
POL. 1185 (1979); Joseph Tanenhaus et al., The Supreme Court’s Certiorari Jurisdiction: Cue Theory, 
in JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 111–32 (Glendon Schubert ed., 1963); Stuart Teger and Douglas 
Kosinski, The Cue Theory of Supreme Court Certiorari Jurisdiction: A Reconsideration, 42 J. POL. 
834 (1980); S. Sidney Ulmer et al., The Decision to Grant or Deny Certiorari: Further Consideration 
of Cue Theory, 6 L. SOC. REV. 637 (1972); S. Sidney Ulmer, The Decision to Grant Certiorari as an 
Indicator to Decision ‘On the Merits,’ 4 POLITY 429 (1972); S. Sydney Ulmer, Selecting Cases for 
Supreme Court Review: An Underdog Model, 72 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 902 (1978); S. Sydney Ulmer, 
The Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions: Conflict as a Predictive Variable, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
901 (1984)). 
 100. Arthur D.Hellman, Case Selection in the Burger Court: A Preliminary Inquiry, 60 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 947, 1012 (1985). 
 101. See generally Joseph Tanenhaus, The Supreme Court’s Certiorari Jurisdiction: Cue Theory, 
in JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 111–32 (Glendon Schubert ed., 1963). 
 102. H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE, AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME 
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model to define “when and how the political and legal natures of the 
justices interact”103 in case selection. He contends that concerns about the 
outcome on the merits bring about an “outcome mode” or a 
“jurisprudential mode”: 
briefly, if a justice cares strongly about the outcome of a case on the 
merits at the time of the cert. decision, then he will enter the 
outcome mode to decide whether or not to take the case. If, 
however, the justice does not feel particularly strongly about the 
outcome of a case on the merits, he enters the jurisprudential mode 
with all its attendant steps. The steps differ in the two modes. 
Oversimplifying at this point, when in the jurisprudential mode, the 
justice makes his decision based on legalistic, jurisprudential types 
of considerations such as whether or not there is a split in the 
federal circuit courts of appeals. In the outcome mode, while the 
justice does not ignore jurisprudential concerns, they do not 
dominate his decision process. Rather, it is dominated by strategic 
considerations related to the outcome of the case on the merits. 
Jurisprudential concerns play a rather different role in the calculus 
. . . . One should not assume that cases that trigger the outcome 
mode are necessarily those of great social import, ideologically 
laden, or with great public policy implications. Likewise, cases 
triggering the jurisprudential mode are not necessarily the ones that 
present only technical “legal” questions. What triggers one mode or 
the other is simply the degree of concern about the outcome on the 
merits.104 
Although there are many different theories on the factors the United 
States Supreme Court takes into consideration in order to grant or deny a 
petition for certiorari, most commentators agree “that the process is both 
legalistic and political.”105 “Further, because different justices will care 
differently about the outcome of different cases, it will always be difficult 
to disentangle the factors that underlie decisions to grant or deny cert.”106 
COURT 117 (1991). 
 103. Id. at 274. 
 104. Id. at 274–75. 
 105. SUSAN LOW BLOCH & THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER, SUPREME COURT POLITICS: THE 
INSTITUTION AND ITS PROCEDURES 372 (1994). 
 106. Id. 
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In addition to the power of controlling its own docket by certiorari, the 
Supreme Court may voluntarily, or sua sponte, ask the parties to reargue a 
case brought before it.107 This power to reopen cases, and therefore select 
specific matters of contention, has brought criticism when used for policy 
making.108 In a significant sense, the United States Supreme Court is a 
political institution where fundamental issues for the American society are 
argued and decided.  
For civil law countries, the force of judicial precedent is one of the 
most outstanding and differentiating particularities of common law. This 
holds especially true in the United States. The doctrine of stare decisis—
of standing by what has been decided—is paramount to understanding the 
stability and coherence of the common law system. The doctrine of 
judicial precedent requires that lower courts abide to their own previous 
rulings or to those of higher courts. Even though there is criticism of stare 
decisis,109 it is very salutary from the point of view of judicial economy to 
prevent parties from appealing through all instances to eventually have 
their case decided with the same ratio decidendi applied in previous cases.  
The United States Supreme Court safeguards its docket very striclty. In 
the past few years, it granted review on around one percent of the petitions 
considered in a one-term period,110 as the statistics below show: 
 107. Rosemary Krimbel, Rehearing Sua Sponte in the U.S. Supreme Court: A Procedure for 
Judicial Policymaking, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 919 (1989). 
 108. Id. 
 109. See generally Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court 
Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817 (1994). 
 110. Unlike the other countries analyzed in this paper, which follow the calendar year, the United 
States Supreme Court’s judicial year starts in October and finishes in June of the next year. For 
example, the Supreme Court Term 2001 initiated in October 2001 finished in June 2002. The Supreme 
Court, 2001 Term, 116 HARV. L. REV. 453, 459–60 (2002). 
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TABLE 2 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT111 
Term Disposition 
of cases 
Remaining 
on the 
docket 
Number of 
cases 
granted 
review 
Term Disposition
of cases 
Remaining 
on the 
docket 
Number of 
cases 
granted 
review 
1950 1,202 119 106 1978 3,943 788 237 
1951 1,207 146 113 1979 3,812 969 231 
1952 1,278 151 115 1980 4,280 864 262 
1953 1,293 160 88 1981 4,456 855 312 
1954 1,352 205 120 1982 4,188 891 304 
 
 
 111. Those figures are based on the Harvard Law Review’s annual statistical summary of the 
Supreme Court’s Term. The Supreme Court, 1950 Term, 65 HARV. L. REV. 107, 179 (1951); The 
Supreme Court, 1951 Term, 66 HARV. L. REV. 89, 177 (1952); The Supreme Court, 1952 Term, 67 
HARV. L. REV. 91, 169 (1953); The Supreme Court, 1953 Term, 68 HARV. L. REV. 105, 188 (1954); 
The Supreme Court, 1954 Term, 69 HARV. L. REV. 120, 202 (1955); The Supreme Court, 1955 Term, 
70 HARV. L. REV. 95, 99 (1956); The Supreme Court, 1956 Term, 71 HARV. L. REV. 94, 97 (1957); 
The Supreme Court, 1957 Term, 72 HARV. L. REV. 98, 99 (1958); The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, 73 
HARV. L. REV. 128, 129 (1959); The Supreme Court, 1959 Term, 74 HARV. L. REV. 97, 99 (1960); 
The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 HARV. L. REV. 83, 85 (1961); The Supreme Court, 1961 Term, 76 
HARV. L. REV. 78, 81 (1962); The Supreme Court, 1962 Term, 77 HARV. L. REV. 81, 83 (1963); The 
Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 HARV. L. REV. 179, 180 (1964); The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 
HARV. L. REV. 105, 106 (1965); The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 80 HARV. L. REV. 125, 143 (1966); 
The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARV. L. REV. 112, 127 (1967); The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 
82 HARV. L. REV. 95, 303 (1968); The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REV. 62, 282 (1969); 
The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARV. L. REV. 32, 248 (1970); The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 
85 HARV. L. REV. 40, 346 (1971); The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REV. 52, 303 (1972); 
The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REV. 57, 306 (1973); The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 
88 HARV. L. REV. 43, 277 (1974); The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REV. 49, 278 (1975); 
The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV. 58, 279 (1976); The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 
91 HARV. L. REV. 72, 298 (1977); The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REV. 57, 332 (1978); 
The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93 HARV. L. REV. 62, 278 (1979); The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 
94 HARV. L. REV. 77, 292 (1980); The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95 HARV. L. REV. 93, 342 (1981); 
The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARV. L. REV. 304, 308 (1982); The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 
97 HARV. L. REV. 295, 299 (1983); The Supreme Court, 1983 Term, 98 HARV. L. REV. 247, 311 
(1984); The Supreme Court, 1984 Term, 99 HARV. L. REV. 322, 326 (1985); The Supreme Court, 1985 
Term, 100 HARV. L. REV. 304, 308 (1986); The Supreme Court, 1986 Term, 101 HARV. L. REV. 362, 
366 (1987); The Supreme Court, 1987 Term, 102 HARV. L. REV. 143, 354 (1988); The Supreme Court, 
1988 Term, 103 HARV. L. REV. 394, 398 (1989); The Supreme Court, 1989 Term, 104 HARV. L. REV. 
359, 363 (1990); The Supreme Court, 1990 Term, 105 HARV. L. REV. 177, 423 (1991); The Supreme 
Court, 1991 Term, 106 HARV. L. REV. 163, 382 (1992); The Supreme Court, 1992 Term, 107 HARV. 
L. REV. 372, 376 (1993); The Supreme Court, 1993 Term, 108 HARV. L. REV. 139, 376 (1994); The 
Supreme Court, 1994 Term, 109 HARV. L. REV. 111, 344 (1995); The Supreme Court, 1995 Term, 110 
HARV. L. REV. 367, 371 (1996); The Supreme Court, 1996 Term, 111 HARV. L. REV. 431, 435 (1997); 
The Supreme Court, 1997 Term, 112 HARV. L. REV. 355, 372-73 (1998); The Supreme Court, 1998 
Term, 113 HARV. L. REV. 400, 406-07 (1999); The Supreme Court, 1999 Term, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
390, 396-97 (2000); The Supreme Court, 2000 Term, 115 HARV. L. REV. 539, 545–46 (2001); The 
Supreme Court, 2001 Term, 116 HARV. L. REV. 453, 459–60 (2002); The Supreme Court, 2002 Term, 
117 HARV. L. REV. 480, 486–87 (2003); The Supreme Court, 2003 Term, 118 HARV. L. REV. 497, 
504–05 (2004); The Supreme Court, 2004 Term, 119 HARV. L. REV. 415, 425–26 (2005). 
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Term Disposition 
of cases 
Remaining 
on the 
docket 
Number of 
cases 
granted 
review 
Term Disposition
of cases 
Remaining 
on the 
docket 
Number of 
cases 
granted 
review 
1955 1,630 219 139 1983 4,162 993 261 
1956 1,670 351 208 1984 4,269 737 264 
1957 1,765 225 143 1985 4,289 869 273 
1958 1,763 281 140 1986 4,339 784 268 
1959 1,787 356 177 1987 4,401 867 271 
1960 1,911 385 111 1988 4,806 851 252 
1961 2,142 428 142 1989 4,908 838 203 
1962 2,324 473 210 1990 5,412 904 141 
1963 2,401 367 177 1991 5,825 945 120 
1964 2,180 482 138 1992 6,336 909 97 
1965 2,683 591 178 1993 6,676 1111 99 
1966 2,890 453 179 1994 7,132 964 93 
1967 2,946 613 255 1995 6,611 954 105 
1968 3,117 767 165 1996 6,687 915 87 
1969 3,357 793 133 1997 6,718 974 87 
1970 3,318 894 184 1998 7,015 1,068 81 
1971 3,645 888 161 1999 7,374 1113 92 
1972 3,748 892 154 2000 7,713 1,252 99 
1973 3,876 1,203 183 2001 8,024 1,152 88 
1974 3,847 821 174 2002 8,342 1,065 91 
1975 3,806 955 172 2003 7,781 1,097 87 
1976 4,006 724 169 2004 7,501 1,092 80 
1977 3,854 850 160     
 
B. Centralized Model 
The European model of judicial review was idealized by Hans Kelsen 
under his theory of the supremacy of the Constitution and the need of 
constitutional guarantee.112 Norman Dorsen, Michael Rosenfeld, András 
Sajó, and Susanne Baer explain that 
with parliamentary democracy in mind, Kelsen argues that 
adherence to the requisite hierarchy emanating from the constitution 
requires a check on the laws passed by the legislature. That check 
must be provided by an independent institution; and since 
traditionally the judicial power in Europe was not sufficiently 
 
 
 112. ALLAN R. BREWER-CARIAS, EL CONTROL CONCENTRADO DE LA CONSTITUTCIONALIDAD DE 
LAS LEYES (ESTUDIO DE DERECHO COMPARADO) [THE CONCENTRATED CONTROL OF 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LAWS (STUDY OF COMPARATIVE LAW)] 111–12 (1994). 
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independent from the other branches of government, ordinary 
judges could not be entrusted with the task. The institution 
recommended by Kelsen, and later developed throughout Europe 
and beyond, is the constitutional court, a specialized body made up 
of independent judges who do not ordinarily come from the ranks of 
the judiciary.113 
This model is known as “centralized” because the power of controlling 
the constitutionality of laws is granted to one judicial organ generally 
referred to as the constitutional court, as opposed to the decentralized 
model, where any court may declare an act unconstitutional.114 Other than 
the structure of the judicial organ with constitutional adjudication power, it 
is important to note that in the European model: 
There are three basic types of review jurisdiction: “abstract” review, 
concrete review, and the individual constitutional complaint 
procedure. Abstract review is “abstract” because the review of 
legislation takes place in the absence of litigation, in American 
parlance, in the absence of a “concrete” case or controversy. 
Concrete review is “concrete” because the review of legislation, or 
other public act, constitutes a separate stage in an ongoing judicial 
process (litigation in the ordinary courts). In individual complaints, 
a private individual alleges the violation of a constitutional right by 
a public act or governmental official, and requests redress from the 
court for this violation.115 
Adopted in many European countries in accordance with their own 
singularities and circumstances, Kelsen’s systematization originated 
particular models of judicial review, such as the constitutional 
adjudication in Austria, Germany, Italy, and France.116 
 113. NORMAN DORSEN, MICHAEL ROSENFELD, ANDRÁS SAJÓ & SUSANNE BAER, COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 111 (2003). 
 114. Id. at 115. 
 115. Id. at 113–14. 
 116. See generally Louis Favoreu, Constitutional Review in Europe, reprinted in DORSEN, supra 
note 113. The centralized model of judicial review was implemented in several countries, including: 
Cyprus (1960), Turkey (1961), Portugal (1976 and 1983), Spain (1980), Belgium (1984), and Poland 
(1985). Id. Wojciech Sadurski explains that 
[a]ll the post-Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have adopted a 
model of judicial review which borrows more—much more—from the Western European 
tradition than from the American one. A composite picture of the system of judicial review of 
the CEE countries would highlight that it is exercised by specially established constitutional 
courts which exclusively exercise the power to make authoritative decisions about the 
unconstitutionality of laws, and whose decisions—taken after the laws have entered into 
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1. Austria 
In 1920, Czechoslovakia and Austria were the first countries to 
establish a constitutional court inspired by the Kelsen model. Because the 
Czechoslovakian Constitutional Court did not hear any cases early on,117 
the Austrian Constitutional Court is considered the oldest judicial 
institution exercising constitutional adjudication in the European model, 
even considering its functions were interrupted by the German occupation 
during World War II.118 
The Constitutional Court is the only Austrian organ with the power of 
constitutional jurisdiction.119 It was created outside the ordinary judiciary 
and legislative branches in order to establish an independent and impartial 
institution for constitutional adjudication.120 The Austrian Constitutional 
Court has the power to annul legislation through different procedures.121 
The first of these procedures is preventive control.122 Though very rare, a 
federal or a provincial government may petition the Court to consider 
whether a bill’s subject matter is under a federal or a provincial 
jurisdiction.123 Concrete control, on the other hand, is exercised when any 
court of appeal, the Supreme Court or the Administrative Court, submit to 
the Constitutional Court a petition for review of a normative act that they 
have to apply in a case before them. Concrete control also may be initiated 
by the Constitutional Court itself (ex-officio), which is the mechanism 
most utilized for constitutional adjudication.124 Another device is the 
abstract control of constitutionality of laws.125 The federal government or 
one third of the members of a provincial assembly have standing to 
challenge a provincial law, whereas the provincial governments or one-
third of the members of the National Council have standing to require a 
force—are made in abstracto (not in connection with any particular litigation) and are final 
(that is, can be overridden only by constitutional amendment). 
Wojciech Sadurski, Legitimacy and Reasons of Constitutional Review After Communism, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE, EAST AND WEST: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURTS IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 163 (2002). 
 117. Stanley L. Paulson, Constitutional Review in the United States and Austria: Notes on the 
Beginnings, 16 RATIO JURIS 213, 224 n.3 (2003). 
 118. Favoreu, supra note 116, at 117 (2003). 
 119. Manfried Welan, Constitutional Review and Legislation in Austria, in CONSTITUTIONAL 
REVIEW AND LEGISLATION: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 63 (Christine Landfried ed., 1988). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 66. 
 123. Id. at 66–67. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
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review of a federal law.126 Finally, individuals may file petitions arguing 
the unconstitutionality of a statute “if it claims to have been violated in its 
rights by the direct impact of legislation without the passing of an 
administrative or judicial decision.”127 However, the Austrian 
Constitutional Court has admitted few such petitions.128 No matter what 
kind of procedure issued, once a law is invalidated for its 
unconstitutionality, the decision of the Constitutional Court has binding 
effect on all courts and administrative authorities.129 
To control the caseload, Manfried Welan explains that “[t]he 
Constitutional Court itself advanced demands for an exoneration of the 
Court from its excessively high workload which were responded to by the 
‘exoneration amendments’ of 1981 and 1984.”130 The Austrian 
Constitutional Court has the power “to reject an appeal a limine if it 
considers its chances to be decided in favor of the plaintiff insufficient, as 
of 1984 it can reject an appeal on the grounds that no clarification of a 
constitutional legal question can be expected.”131 The statistics below 
show the caseload of the Austrian Constitutional Court. The number of 
backlogged cases for the year 2003 amounted to 1,159.132 
TABLE 3 
AUSTRIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT133 
Year Number of 
cases filed 
Number of 
Judgments 
Cases pending 
from prior term 
1975 645 444 252 
1980 838 609 1,133 
 
 
 126. Id. Welan explains that 
[a]bstract control is rare: The Federal Government is empowered to contest the 
constitutionality of a Landes (provincial) law, every Landes government may contest a 
federal law, one third of the members of the National Council can petition the Constitutional 
Court review of federal laws, and one third of the members of a provincial assembly 
(Landtag) that of a Landes law, if the provincial Constitution includes a pertinent provision 
(as in the case of The Burgenland, Salzburg, Tirol, Vorarlberg and Vienna). 
Id. 
 127. Id. at 67–68. 
 128. Id. at 68. 
 129. Id. at 69. 
 130. Id. at 79. 
 131. Id. 
 132. STATISTIK AUSTRIA STATISTISCHE JAHRBUCH ÖSTERREICHS 2005 [STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 
OF AUSTRIA 2005] 459–60, available at http://www.statistik.at/jahrbuch_2005/pdfe/k35.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 3, 2006) 
 133. Id. 
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Year Number of 
cases filed 
Number of 
Judgments 
Cases pending 
from prior term 
1985 1,358 1,853 1,443 
1990 4,554 2,252 976 
1995 5,762 5,639 1,879 
2000 2,789 2,902 1,742 
2001 2,261 2,706 1,629 
2002 2,569 2,594 1,884 
2003 2,217 2,122 1,159 
 
2. Germany 
The German Federal Constitutional Court was created in 1949 and, 
unlike the Austrian model, is part of the judiciary.134 Known as “the 
supreme guardian of the Constitution,”135 the German Federal 
Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction is mainly based on abstract judicial 
review, diffuse judicial review and constitutional complaints.136 As for the 
abstract judicial review procedures, the federal government, state 
governments, or one-third of the members of the Bundestag137 may file a 
petition directly to the German Federal Constitutional Court challenging 
“the compatibility between a federal and a state law or between these laws 
and the Basic Law” without an actual dispute.138 The concrete judicial 
review “arises out of an ordinary law suit, when a court is convinced that a 
federal or a state law, on the basis of which the case must be decided, is 
unconstitutional.”139 In this particular procedure, whenever lower court 
judges conclude that a statute is incompatible with the Basic Law, they 
must certify the case to the Constitutional Court, which will decide 
whether the law is unconstitutional.140 Established in 1969, the 
constitutional complaint “can be lodged by any person asserting a 
violation by a public authority of either basic rights or certain other 
 
 
 134. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 92 (F.R.G.). 
 135. BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 112, at 71. 
 136. Wolfgang Zeidler, The Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany: 
Decisions on the Constitutionality of Legal Norms, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 504, 505–06 (1987). 
 137. Bundestag is the Lower House of the German Parliament.  
 138. Christine Landfried, Constitutional Review and Legislation in the Federal Republic of 
Germany, in CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW AND LEGISLATION: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 152 
(Christine Landfried ed., 1988). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Zeidler, supra note 136, at 505. 
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constitutional rights . . . . However, available legal recourse must be 
exhausted prior to any such review by the Federal Constitutional Court.”141 
All decisions of the Constitutional Court, no matter which procedure is 
chosen, have binding effect. 
The constitutional complaint is overwhelmingly the most utilized 
mechanism to access the constitutional jurisdiction and it is responsible for 
around ninety-five percent of all constitutional cases filed.142 Nevertheless, 
successful complaints reach around one percent of the outcomes.143 For 
manifestly inappropriate complaints, that is to say, if there is an abuse of 
process, the Constitutional Court may require fees of up to 2,600 Euros.144 
The number of filings before the German Federal Constitutional Court is 
relatively stable, as statistics below demonstrate: 
TABLE 4 
THE GERMAN FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT145 
Year Number of 
Cases filed 
Number of 
Judgments 
1995 5,911 5,064 
1996 5,246 5,194 
1997 5,078 5,006 
1998 4,783 4,999 
1999 4,885 5,207 
2000 4,831 5,241 
2001 4,620 4,814 
2002 4,692 4,715 
2003 5,200 4,735 
2004 5,589 5,612 
 
 
 
 141. Id. at 506. 
 142. Landfried, supra note 138. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Gesetz űber dad Bundesverfassungsgencht [Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz] (BVerfG) 
[Law of the federal Constitutional Court], Mar. 12, 1951, BGBI.1 at 243, § 34, last amended by 
Gesetz, Dec. 15, 2004, BGBI.1 at 3396 (F.R.G.), available at http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bverfgg/ (last 
visited Jan. 10, 2006). 
 145. Aufgaben, Verfahren und Organisation des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, Statistik für das 
Geschäftsjahr 2004 [Tasks, Procedures and Organization of the Federal Constitutional Court, Statistics 
for the Financial Year 2004], available at http://www.bverfg.de/text/deutsch/organisation/ 
statisfik.2004/index.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2005). 
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3. Italy 
After World War II, the Italian Constitution of 1948146 created the 
Italian Constitutional Court as an independent organ outside the judiciary 
in charge of balancing the other organs of the state.147 As article 134 of the 
Italian Constitution states, the Constitutional Court has jurisdiction over 
disputes concerning the constitutionality of laws and acts with the 
force of law adopted by states or regions; conflicts arisen over the 
allocation of powers between branches of government within the 
state, between the state and regions, and between regions; on 
accusations raised against the president in accordance with the 
constitution.148 
The Constitutional Court also passes judgment on the acceptance of 
abrogative referenda.149 
The Italian Constitutional Court jurisdiction combines abstract and 
concrete judicial review.150 Unlike the German Federal Constitutional 
Court, the Italian Constitutional Court does not accept any individual 
appeals directly from any citizens nor from parliamentarian groups.151 The 
direct judicial review is restricted to the government of the Republic and 
of the Regions. Article 127 of the Italian Constitution states: 
The Government may submit the constitutional legitimacy of a 
regional law to the Constitutional Court within sixty days from its 
publication, when it deems that the regional law exceeds the 
competence of the Region. 
 146. Costituzione (COST.) art. 134 (Italy 1948). Even though the Italian Constitution created the 
Constitutional Court in 1949, the Court began its activities in 1956 only. See Michele Santoni & 
Francesco Zucchini, Veto Players and the Constitutional Court: the Italian Case 16 (2001), available 
at http://polis.unipmn.it/epcs/papers/santoni.pdf. 
 147. BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 112, at 121–22. 
 148. COST. art. 134. 
 149. Louis Favoreu, supra note 116, at 118. Article 75 of the Italian Constitution states: 
A popular referendum shall be held to abrogate, totally or partially, a law or an act having the 
force of law, when requested by five hundred thousand electors or five regional councils. A 
referendum is not permitted in the case of tax, budget, amnesty and pardon laws, in 
authorization or ratification of international treaties. All citizens eligible to vote for the 
Chamber of deputies have the right to participate in referendums. The proposal subjected to 
referendum is approved if the majority of those with voting rights have voted and a majority 
of votes validly cast has been reached. The law establishes the procedures for conducting a 
referendum. 
COST. art. 75. 
 150. Alessandro Pizzoruso, Constitutional Review and Legislation in Italy, in CONSTITUTIONAL 
REVIEW AND LEGISLATION: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 114 (Christine Landfried ed., 1988). 
 151. Id. 
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 A Region may submit the constitutional legitimacy of a State or 
regional law or measure having the force of law to the 
Constitutional Court within sixty days from its publication, when it 
deems that said law or measure infringes upon its competence.152 
The indirect or “certified” judicial review depends on the initiative of 
any ordinary judge who, “acting on his own initiative or on a motion from 
one of the parties,” suspends the judgment of a case brought before him in 
which there is a relevant or not manifestly unfounded constitutional 
challenge to a law or enactment of parliament having force of law, and 
sends this question to the Constitutional Court.153 Ordinary judges may 
exercise constitutional adjudication of the normative acts which do not 
have force of law.154 Indeed, the Italian system is concentrated in relation 
to statutes and acts with force of law, and it is diffuse in reference to lower 
hierarchy norms. When the Constitutional Court declares a law 
unconstitutional, its decision has binding effect.155 If the Court rejects the 
argument of unconstitutionality, the decision is inter partes; therefore the 
same question can be raised again, but not by the same judge.  
Although its jurisdiction embraces four different functions, the Italian 
Constitutional Court workload is predominately related to the constitutional 
validity of laws. As Alfonso Celotto explains, on a rough average the Italian 
Constitutional Court delivers 500 decisions per year, of which around eighty-
five percent refer to constitutional judicial review.156 About eighty percent of 
the Court’s total work load consists of indirect judicial review, while five 
percent is comprised of direct judicial review.157 The following table shows the 
number of decisions issued by the Court: 
 152. COST. art. 127. 
 153. Pizzoruso, supra note 150, at 114–15. 
 154. Tania Groppi, A Justica Constitucional em Itália [The Constitutional Justice in Italy], SUB 
JUDICE 20/21, 71–77 (2002). 
 155. Pizzorusso, supra note 150, at 121. 
 156. ALFONSO CELOTTO, LA CORTE COSTITUZIONALE [THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT] 51–52 (Il 
Mulino 2004). 
 157. Id.  
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TABLE 5 
THE ITALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT158 
Year Number of Judgments Year 
Number of 
judgments Year 
Number of 
Judgments 
1956 34 1972 224 1988 1165 
1957 129 1973 189 1989 607 
1958 83 1974 301 1990 583 
1959 69 1975 251 1991 521 
1960 75 1976 275 1992 499 
1961 79 1977 168 1993 509 
1962 127 1978 87 1994 493 
1963 174 1979 156 1995 542 
1964 120 1980 197 1996 437 
1965 101 1981 205 1997 471 
1966 130 1982 266 1998 471 
1967 156 1983 377 1999 471 
1968 143 1984 309 2000 592 
1969 166 1985 387 2001 447 
1970 205 1986 319 2002 536 
1971 210 1987 641 2003 382 
 
4. France 
In France, the Constitutional Council is the organ in charge of 
constitutional review.159 The name of this organ in itself, instead of “court” 
or “tribunal,” shows that the intention of the 1958 French Constitution 
drafters was to terminate the parliament hegemony while avoiding the 
establishment of a proper constitutional adjudication as other European 
countries were developing at that time.160 As for its creation, the 
Constitutional Council reviewed formal aspects of laws, such as whether 
the legislative process was correct and whether the division of 
competences between the Parliament and the Executive was respected.161 
 
 
 158. Id. 
 159. Louis Favoreu, The Constitutional Council and Parliament in France, in CONSTITUTIONAL 
REVIEW AND LEGISLATION 88 (Christine Landfried ed., 1988). 
 160. Dominique Rousseau, Do Conselho Constitucional ao Tribunal Constitucional? [From the 
Constitutional Council to the Constitutional Tribunal?], in SUB JUDICE 20/21, 65–70 (2002).  
 161. Id. 
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In 1971, the Constitutional Council broadened its power of judicial review 
in the famous Associations Law Decision,162 by which it struck down a bill 
on the merits that it limited the freedom of association, and therefore 
assumed its role as “institutional guardian of fundamental rights against 
infringement by challenged legislation.”163 
Constitutional jurisdiction in France is a priori and in abstract, that is 
to say, judicial review is exercised over the text of bills before their 
promulgation.164 In this system, once an enactment of Parliament is 
promulgated, it cannot be challenged. The French Constitution commands 
that “Institutional Acts, before their promulgation, and the rules of 
procedure of the parliamentary assemblies, before their entry into force, 
must be referred to the Constitutional Council, which shall rule on their 
conformity with the Constitution.”165 As for ordinary statutes and 
international treaties, they are not under the mandatory jurisdiction of the 
Constitutional Council; those normative acts may or not be referred to the 
Constitutional Council before their promulgation.166 In any case, once a 
request is submitted, “the Constitutional Council must rule within one 
month” or eight days “if the matter is urgent.”167 
If an international commitment is declared unconstitutional, 
authorization to ratify it can only be given after an amendment of the 
Constitution.168 “When a bill is declared unconstitutional, it may not be 
promulgated nor enter into force, and the decision of the Constitutional 
Council is binding to all administrative or jurisdictional authorities.”169 
The standing for submitting a request before the Constitutional Council is 
limited to the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the President 
of the National Assembly, the President of the Senate, and sixty deputies 
or sixty senators.170 Other than constitutional adjudication, the 
 162. CC decision no. 71-44DC, July 16, 1971, Rec. 29. 
 163. DORSEN, supra note 113, at 130. 
 164. La Constitution (CONST.) art. 61 (Fr. 1958). 
 165. CONST. art. 61. 
 166. Id. art. 61. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. art. 54. 
 169. BERNARD POULLAIN, LA PRATIQUE FRANÇAISE DE LA JUSTICE CONSTITUTIONNELLE [THE 
FRENCH PRACTICE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE] 27 (1990). 
 170. Marie-Claire Ponthoreau & Jacques Ziller, The Experience of the French Conseil 
Constitutionnel: Political and Social Context and Current Legal-Theoretical Debates, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE, EAST AND WEST, DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURTS IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 124–25 (Wojciech Sadurski 
ed., 2002). Another important development of the constitutional jurisdiction in France took place in 
1974, when the standing for referring bills to the Constitutional Council was broadened to include 
sixty deputies or sixty senators. JOHN A. ROHR, FOUNDING REPUBLICS IN FRANCE AND AMERICA, A 
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Constitutional Council is in charge of ensuring the proper conduct of 
referendum proceedings171 and of presidential, deputy, and senatorial 
elections.172 The statistics below show decisions taken by the 
Constitutional Council, including those related to elections and referenda. 
TABLE 6 
THE FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL173 
Year Number of 
decisions 
Year Number of 
Decisions 
1958 30 1982 30 
1959 124 1983 33 
1960 22 1984 23 
1961 22 1985 28 
1962 22 1986 65 
1963 95 1987 26 
1964 13 1988 126 
1965 22 1989 36 
1966 13 1990 27 
1967 153 1991 28 
1968 61 1992 40 
1969 22 1993 823 
1970 16 1994 38 
1971 15 1995 75 
1972 14 1996 66 
1973 59 1997 153 
1974 20 1998 324 
1975 15 1999 32 
1976 28 2000 43 
1977 32 2001 45 
1978 74 2002 173 
1979 21 2003 49 
1980 31 2004 49 
1981 84   
 
 
STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE 143 (1995). 
 171. CONST. art. 60. 
 172. Id. arts. 58–59. 
 173. Les Cahiers du Conseil Constitutionnel [Books of the Constitutional Council] no 18, 17 
(2005), available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/Cahiers/ccc18/tableau.pdf (last visited Jan. 
10, 2005). 
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IV. PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION IN BRAZIL 
The promulgation of the Federal Constitution of 1988 was a landmark 
in the consolidation of democracy in Brazil. After twenty years of military 
dictatorship, the National Constituent Assembly promulgated the 
Constitution to institute a democratic state “for the purpose of ensuring the 
exercise of social and individual rights, liberty, security, well-being, 
development, equality and justice as supreme values of a fraternal, 
pluralist and unprejudiced society, founded on social harmony and 
committed, in the internal and international orders, to the peaceful 
settlement of disputes.”174 As the safeguard of the Federal Constitution, 
the SFC is one of the most relevant political institutions in Brazil and the 
escalating litigation reflects the active participation of society, particularly 
in defending fundamental rights and pleading for constitutional 
guarantees. 
As democracy strengthens and legal reform heightens, an efficient 
judiciary is necessary to ensure the rule of law in changing times, while 
satisfactorily responding to public demand. An expeditious judiciary is 
also fundamental for enhancing economic development.175 The Brazilian 
economist Armando Pinheiro measured the economic impact of the 
malfunctioning of the Brazilian judiciary and concluded that “for the 
[Brazilian] population in general, slowness is the biggest, if not the only, 
defect of the Brazilian judicial system.”176 His research also suggests that 
“a significant improvement in the performance of the judiciary in . . . 
Brazil would result in increases of 13.7%, 10.4% and 9.4% respectively in 
levels of production, investment and employment.”177 
Pinheiro’s economic analysis of the judiciary asserts that “[t]he 
judiciary is one of the institutions whose importance for the proper 
functioning of a market economy, guaranteeing property rights and 
enforcing contracts, has only recently been fully recognised.”178 The 
 174. C.F. pmbl. 
 175. Nelson Humberto Martinez, Rule of Law and Economic Efficiency, in JUSTICE DELAYED, 
JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA 3–13 (Edmundo Jarquín & Fernando Carrillo eds., 1998). This 
article highlights the importance of effective judicial systems and legal order that not only guarantee 
respect for individual and collective rights and liberties, but that also ensure the success of the 
economic reforms in the countries of the regions. The lack of a solid and effective legal framework has 
a negative impact on investment, savings, and transaction costs, which makes judicial reform urgent. 
Id. 
 176. Armando Castelar Pinheiro, Economics and Justice: Concepts and Empirical Evidence 7, at 
http://www.ifb.com.br/english/documentos/castelarIngles17_10.pdf (last visited Jan. 7, 2006). 
 177. Id. at 2. 
 178. Id. at 1. 
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justification of judicial reform for improving development and business 
opportunities raises a lot of debate concerning political and ideological 
trends. Additionally, it raises serious doubts about the economical 
assessment of the situation. As Pinheiro points out: 
[t]he empirical analysis of the impact of the judiciary on economic 
performance is rendered difficult by the lack of good proxies for the 
quality of the judiciary and by the fact that this quality varies little 
over a period of time in a given country. Nonetheless some work 
has been carried out in an attempt to quantify this influence by 
means of the analysis of cross-sections of countries based on the 
principle of conditional convergence, in which it is assumed that the 
quality of the judiciary affects the equilibrium of the income per 
capita of countries and, above all, the rate of increase of GDP per 
capita. In general, these studies prove the relevance of the good 
functioning of the judiciary to economic development, even though 
the limitations of this methodology should not be ignored.179 
Albeit an economic analysis of the judiciary may be desirable, or even 
accurate, the urgency to address the irrational and dilatory nature of the 
current system of decentralized judicial review prevents this Article from 
deepening the economic debate as it should prevent any rational criticism 
from straying far from the issue of judicial reform. 
Whether judicial reform enhances economic development, it is a 
national consensus that the judicial system should be restructured to 
respond to the increasing litigation demands that accompany the 
democratization of Brazilian society after the Federal Constitution of 
1988. The extraordinary appellate jurisdiction of the SFC, which is the 
focus of this paper, has proven to be irrational, slow, and costly. The 
challenging question now is what measures should be taken to improve its 
structure to achieve a steadfast and well-organized jurisdiction.  
A. New Government’s Interest in Reforming the Judiciary 
Judges, politicians, scholars, attorneys, and society as a whole agree 
that some constitutional reform of the judiciary has to be implemented. 
Article 60 of the Brazilian Federal Constitution describes the 
constitutional amendment process.180 Proposals to amend the Federal 
Constitution must be initiated by either one-third, or more, of the members 
 179. Id. at 2. 
 180. C.F. art. 60. 
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of the Chamber or the Federal Senate, the President of the Republic, or 
more than one-half of the Legislative Assemblies of the units of the 
Federation.181 Each of these Legislative Assemblies must express itself by 
the relative majority of its members.182 The proposal must be discussed 
and voted upon in each House of the National Congress.183 The voting 
takes place in two separate readings and will be considered approved with 
three-fifths of the votes in each reading.184 
Despite the unanimous support for reforming the judiciary, an abysmal 
disaccord arose when it came to deciding upon the measures to be taken to 
improve the system. The National Congress has been discussing judiciary 
reform since 1992. The legislative proposal185 for amending the 
Constitution regarding the judiciary initiated in the Chamber of the 
Deputies,186 which passed a substitutive proposal that was remitted to the 
Federal Senate for discussion in June 2000.187 With some amendments 
offered by the Commission of Constitution and Justice and by the Senate 
Plenary, reporting Senator, Bernardo Cabral, submitted the final proposal 
for deliberation of the Senate Plenary in the Session of December 4, 
2002.188 However, the then opposition, which is currently the leftist ruling 
party,189 managed to postpone the proposal’s consideration to the new 
legislative term, starting in February 2003, which would consist of a newly 
elected Chamber of Deputies and a two-thirds renovated Senate, as well as 
a new President of the Republic.190 
The new government introduced many changes in the political 
landscape. At the federal level, the Minister of Justice, Marcio Thomaz 
Bastos, announced the creation of a Secretariat of Judicial Reform directly 
subordinate to him.191 The Minister made clear that he wanted a radical 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. PEC 96/92. PEC is the abbreviation of “Proposta de Emenda à Constituição” (Constitutional 
Amending Proposal). 
 186. C.F. arts. 44–45. The Legislative Power is exercised by the National Congress, which is 
composed of the Chamber of Deputies and the Federal Senate. The Chamber of Deputies is composed 
of representatives of the people, elected, by the proportional system, in each state, territory and in the 
Federal District. Id. 
 187. PEC 29/2000. 
 188. Requerimento n.693, em 04/12/2002, para o adiamento da votaçâo [Request no. 693 on Dec. 
4, 2002, for postponement of vote]. See Tramitçâo de Matérias (Proposições) [Status of Subject 
Matters (Bills)], available at http://www.senado.gov.br/sf/atividade/materia/detalhes.asp?p_cod_ 
mate=44577. 
 189. Partido dos Trabalhadores–PT [Worker’s Party]. 
 190. In 2003, general elections were held in Brazil in the federal and state levels.  
 191. The National Secretariat of the Reform of the Judiciary aims to elaborate a new proposal for 
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reform in the justice administration and a radical review of the amendment 
proposed by the National Congress.192 On several occasions, he expressed 
his firm position against the binding effect of SFC’s decisions. He 
declared that the Súmula Vinculante would immobilize the first instance 
judges and sterilize the judiciary.193 He also said that this mechanism 
would implement the dictatorship of the SFC.194 Indeed, the Minister of 
Justice considered judiciary reform one of the government’s highest 
priorities while he opposed the existing proposal. 
The creation of the Secretariat for Judicial Reform caused unease and 
tension between the legislature and the judiciary. The executive actions 
outraged the Congress’ opposition parties because it disregarded the 
constitutional amendment proposal taking place in the Senate, 
undermining Congress’ perogatives to negotiate and legislate, not to 
mention all the work that had already been done, such as public addresses, 
amendments, and debates.  
The judiciary disclaimed the fact that an unknown subordinate of an 
Executive Ministry would be in charge of such a crucial and intricate 
reform with members of the judiciary and Congress. The President of the 
SFC, Minister Maurício Corrêa, declared the creation of the Secretariat of 
Judiciary Reform “nonsense” and a “discourtesy,”195 while the President 
of the Superior Labor Court declared it an “excrescence.”196 The lack of 
the judiciary reform to send to the Congress. Decree 4.685/2003 defines the attributions of the 
Secretariat as:  
I–to formulate, promote, supervise and coordinate the processes of modernization of the 
administration of the Brazilian justice, through articulation with the other federal bodies, the 
Judiciary Power, the Legislative Power, Public Prosecutors, State governments, international 
agencies and civil society organizations; 
II–to orientate and coordinate actions towards the adoption of improvement measures of the 
judiciary’s services provided to citizens; 
III–propose measures and examine the Brazilian judiciary reform’ proposals; and  
IV–to direct, negotiate and coordinate studies related to the activities of reform of the 
Brazilian justice. 
Decreto No. 4.685, de 29 de abril de 2003, D.O.U. de 30.04 2003 (Braz.). 
 192. Press Release of Ministry of Justice, Criada a Secretaria de Reforma do Judiciario [National 
Secretariat of Judicial reform is Created], Apr. 30, 2003, available at http://www.mj.gov.br/ 
noticias/2003/abril/RLS300403=serjud.htm. 
 193. Press Release of Ministry of Justice, Ministro Rejeita Súmula Vinculante em Audiência no 
Senado, [Minister rejects binding “Súmula” in Public Audience at the Senate], Feb. 10, 2004, 
available at http://www.mj.gov.br/noticias/2004/Fevereiro/rls100204-ministro_rejeita_s%C3% 
BAmula_vinculan.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2005). 
 194. Id. 
 195. Severino Gomes, Maurício Corrêa volta a criticar duramente o governo [Mauricio Corrêa 
strongly criticizes the government again], CONSULTOR JURÍDICO, Oct. 16, 2003, available at 
http://conjur.uol.com.br/textos/22289/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2005). 
 196. Luiz Orlando Carneiro, Francisco Fausto: É uma Excrescência, [Francisco Fausto: It is an 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 99 Oliveira book pages.doc2/28/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
138 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 5:99 
 
 
 
 
 
 
legitimacy of this Secretariat to promote any coordination was self-
evident. As a result, instead of converging discussion and bringing 
solutions, this body exacerbated the existing fissures between the political 
powers.  
Controlled by the government’s party, the Chamber of Deputies, 
created a Commission for the Judiciary Reform in June 2003.197 The 
Commission scheduled several public audiences with judges, scholars, and 
civil society.198 This Commission manifested the government’s intention 
of reinitiating all proceedings and deliberations over the subject matter.  
Meanwhile, Lula’s government had been pushing for congressional 
legislation on tax reform and pension reform, which both succeeded.199 
The present administration is definitely committed to implementing 
structural reforms in many areas of the Brazilian State. Despite all of the 
controversy and dissent, there is space and political will to materialize 
reforms. Therefore, this is the right time to discuss, explain, and prove the 
best solutions to optimize the judiciary. The key in addressing the major 
deficiency of the Brazilian judiciary—its delay in rendering final judicial 
decisions—lies within the SFC’s extraordinary appellate jurisdiction. 
V. NEWLY-ENACTED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 45 
For more than ten years, Congress discussed judiciary reform while 
promoting public hearings, presenting innumerous amendments to the 
original proposal, and listening to authorities and scholars of the judiciary 
as well as representatives of the Brazilian Bar Association and of public 
advocacy. At the end of 2004, the legislative proposal was finally voted 
Excrescence], JORNAL DO BRASIL, in CLIPPING ELETRÔNICO DA ASSESSORIA DE COMUNICAÇÃO 
SOCIAL DO MINISTÉRIO DA JUSTIÇA [ELETRONIC BULLETIN OF THE SOCIAL COMMUNICATION 
ADVISORY OF THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE], Oct. 19, 2003, available at http://www.dpf.gov.br/ 
DCS/clipping/outubro/CS%2019-10-2003%20_1_%20Edi__o_.htm#n17167 (last visited Oct. 14, 
2005). 
 197. Regina Maria Groba Bandeira, Consultoria Legislativa da Camara dos Deputados, Reforma 
do Judiciário-Aspectos Relevantes em Discussão no Congresso Nacional [Legislative Consultancy of 
the Chamber of the Deputies, Judiciary Reform—Relevant Aspects in Discussion in the National 
Congress] 11, Sept. 2003, available at http://www.camara.gov.br/internet/diretoria/Conleg/ 
estudios.asp (last visited Jan. 10, 2006). 
 198. Agenda de Reuniões da Comissão Especial de Reforma do Judiciário da Câmara dos 
Deputados [Schedule of Meetings of the Special Commission for the Judiciary Reform of the Chamber 
of Deputies], available at http://www2.camara.gov.br/comissoes/temporarias/especial/refjudic (last 
visited Jan. 10, 2006). 
 199. After a meeting in February 2003, the newly inaugurated President of Brazil and the 
governors of all Brazilian states announced that tax reform and pension reform were priorities to the 
sustainable development of the country. See Carta de Brasília [Statement of Brasília], available at 
http://www.radiobras.gov.br/integras/03/integra_240203_1.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2006). 
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and promulgated.200 In December 2004, Congress enacted Constitutional 
Amendment 45, bringing about several changes in the judiciary.201 
Constitutional Amendment 45, however, does not address the structural 
problems of the judiciary in-depth and does little to ensure a less time-
consuming system. As far as it concerns the extraordinary appellate 
jurisdiction of the SFC, Constitutional Amendment 45 introduces three 
main points: the insertion of the doctrine of binding precedent, the creation 
of a requirement of general repercussion for the admission of 
extraordinary appeals, and the addition of a hypothesis of extraordinary 
appeal.202 
A. The Doctrine of Binding Precedent 
Constitutional Amendment 45 states that the SFC may, ex officio, or 
upon initiative by two-thirds of its members after reiterated decisions on 
the same matter, approve a Súmula with binding effect to all other 
judiciary bodies and the federal, state, and municipal public 
administration—it may also revise or cancel it as established by statutory 
law.203 
The Súmula resolves the validity, interpretation, and efficacy of the 
rules which are the object of disagreement among judicial bodies and 
between these and the public administration that brings on serious juridical 
insecurity and the relevant multiplication of suits concerning identical 
issues.204 Known as Súmula Vinculante, this mechanism implements the 
doctrine of binding precedent specifically for SFC decisions.205 
Constitutional Amendment 45 does not extend the stare decisis principle 
to any other court nor to indiscriminate rulings of the SFC.206 
 200. See Press Release of Agência Senado [Senate Press Agency], Congresso Promulga Reforma 
do Judiciário [Congress Promulgates Judical Reform], Dec. 6, 2004, available at http://www.senado. 
gov.br/agencia/verNoticia.aspx?codNoticia=42805&parametros=reforma+do+judiciario (last visited 
Jan. 10, 2006). 
 201. C.F. amend 45. 
 202. Id. There are some superficial changes on the original jurisdiction and the abstract 
constitutional adjudication, but these changes are not subject of discussion in this paper because they 
function reasonably well. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Parecer nº 538, de 2002 da Comissão de Constituição, Justiça e Cidadania sobre a Proposta 
de Emenda à Constituição 29, de 2000 (nº 92/96, na Câmara dos Deputados), relator Senador Bernardo 
Cabral [Report number 538, year 2002, of the Commission of Constitution Justice and Citizenship 
about the Constitutional Amending Proposal 29, year 2000 (number 92/96, at the Chamber of 
Deputies), reporting Senator Bernardo Cabral]. 
 205. C.F. amend 45, art. 103-A. 
 206. C.F. amend 45. 
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As can be observed from the different models of judicial review above, 
constitutional adjudication exercised by the highest judicial body or by a 
specialized court is assimilated with the concept of the binding effect of 
decisions.207 Even in Brazil, the binding effect of SFC decisions was not a 
novelty because it was implemented in the centralized judicial review 
jurisdiction. The open debate in the Brazilian political arena regarding the 
binding effect of the Súmula did not focus on the limitation of the 
legislative and executive by the judiciary, however. It focused on the 
relation between the power of ordinary judges and the SFC, the highest 
judicial body in the Brazil. One of the main arguments against the binding 
effect of the Súmula held that all judges should be independent to judge 
according to their consciousness and convictions and be able to diverge 
from the Súmula and plead its revocation.208 Should this argument hold 
true, then the question is: What are the costs of this freedom of 
consciousness among judges? And, most importantly, who is paying the 
price? The “right” of an ordinary judge to dissent from the Súmula is 
harmful to the party favored by the SFC ruling, be it a citizen, the 
government, or a corporation.209 It stimulates the opposite party to litigate 
for a right that will eventually be denied much later, causing false 
expectations and future frustration, and prolonging an already lost case. It 
also harms the judiciary, which ends up being discredited and distrusted 
because of inconsistent decisions and disregard of previous SFC rulings. 
The function of the judiciary is to settle controversies in society and not to 
serve as a venue for academic debates and judges’ repeated dissent. The 
 207. The only exception that could be argued is the inter partes effect when the Italian 
Constitutional Court rejects an argument of unconstitutionality. However, I see this provision as an 
observance of the presumption of constitutionality of laws and therefore, not as a reluctance to give the 
decisions a binding effect.  
 208. Evandro Lins e Silva, Crime de Hermenêutica e Súmula Vinculante [Crime of Hermeneutics 
and Binding Súmula], available at http://campus.fortunecity.com/clemson/493/jus/m05-011.htm (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2005). 
 209. Pinheiro states that 
[c]ompanies, individuals and judges themselves single out slowness as being the principal 
problem of Brazilian justice. Research carried out amongst companies by the Institute of 
Economic, Social and Political Studies of São Paulo (IDESP) shows that their lawsuits take 
31, 38 and 46 months, on average, to reach a decision in the Labour, State and Federal courts. 
However, companies have an ambivalent relationship with the slowness of the judicial 
system. For the delay in obtaining a decision is not always prejudicial to companies: in the 
IDESP research, a quarter of them pointed out, for example, that slowness in labour lawsuits 
is beneficial to them. The other side of the coin in such a position is the fact that many of the 
case which reach the courts every year, thus contributing to its slowness, are not seeking to 
defend rights but to exploit this very slowness as a means of putting off fulfillment 
obligations. 
Pinheiro, supra note 176, at 1–2. 
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independence of the judiciary should reflect a guarantee for the people and 
not a privilege of a judicial class.210 In fact, this so-called “independence” 
proved a disservice not only to the parties in litigation but also to the entire 
society and democratic institutions. 
Not surprisingly, the Brazilian Bar Association211 vehemently opposed 
the binding effect of the Súmula. It campaigned against this device 
claiming that the Súmula would immobilize the judiciary and the law.212 
Nonetheless, one should keep in mind that lawyers benefit from the 
“judge’s right to dissent” regardless of the party they represent, because it 
increases litigation. The binding impact will affect demand for lawyers’ 
services by reducing litigation time. It is emblematic that the Minister of 
Justice, Mr. Bastos, a very successful lawyer who left private practice to 
join the current government, said that the binding effect would create “the 
dictatorship of the SFC in Brazil, because the Súmula would have more 
force than a statute.”213 However, this is a rhetorical argument because the 
Constitution has more force than a statute, and the SFC, as a guardian of 
the Constitution, must interpret statutes in light of the Constitution, 
whether its decisions have binding effect or not. Disrespecting the 
constitutional interpretation given by the SFC undermines the basis of 
constitutionalism itself.  
Apart from the sectarian interests of the Bar Association, the 
underlying question about the binding effect of the Súmula involved the 
struggle of power between the executive and the judiciary. The binding 
 210. Ellen Gracie Northfleet, Ainda Sobre o Efeito Vinculante [Still on the Binding Effect], in 
REVISTA DE INFORMAÇÃO [LEGISLATIVA LEGISLATIVE INFORMATION REVIEW] 133–34 (1996). 
 211. Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil (OAB). 
 212. The President of the Brazilian Bar Association, Rubens Approbato, declared in the Public 
Audience of the Special Commission of the Judiciary Reform of the Chamber of Deputies on July 9, 
2003 that with the binding effect 
we would not need judges anymore, since we would not need convincedness anymore. We 
finish with the intelligence, with the creativity, with the evolution of something living, which 
is called the law. The great scientific and juridical innovations in this country were born from 
the creativity and inconformism of repetitive decisions that not always are the fairest. 
Therefore, creating this kind of plastering of idea would not be ideal, because it plasters not 
only the judge, but also all of us. We, lawyers, are the ones who create the jurisprudence by 
means of our creativity and of our intelligence. We study the facts in relation to the juridical 
content and match these two things to present them, sometimes, in a new way, showing that it 
cannot be what has been done. 
Câmara dos Deputados, Comissão de Reforma do Judiciário, Audiência Pública nO. 0945/03 [Chamber 
of Deputies, Commission of Reform of the Judiciary, Public Hearing no. 0945/03], at 12, available at 
http://www.camara.gov.br/internet/Comissao/index/esp/reformadojudiciariont090703.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 14, 2005). 
 213. Denise Rothenburg, Bastos Ataca “Ditadurá” do STF [Bastos Attacks “Dictatorship” of 
SFC], CORREIO BRAZILIENSE, Feb. 11, 2004, available at http://clipping.planejamento.gov.br/ 
Noticias.asp?NOTCod=104980 (last visited Jan. 10, 2006). 
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effect, as Constitutional Amendment 45 establishes, applies not only to the 
judiciary, but also to the federal, state, and local governments. The 
government is the main client and one of the greatest beneficiaries of 
delayed justice. Let us consider the example of the Severance-Pay Fund. If 
a governmental policy provokes thousands of lawsuits by affected citizens, 
it would take years to have a final decision, with the likelihood that those 
responsible for the policy will not be in office anymore. Therefore, 
politicians benefit from the procrastination of executing an eventually 
unfavorable decision, not only because the real costs will be paid by their 
successors but also because the political setback and accountability 
involved in the SFC’s ruling of unconstitutionality of a given 
governmental policy will be diluted or even innocuous as time passes. As 
for the government successors, they can easily blame the previous 
administration for an unconstitutional governmental policy and thus avoid 
taking personal responsibility for it. 
It is true that the binding effect concentrates power in the SFC, but it 
does not necessarily restrain the independence of the judiciary. Before the 
binding effect, the SFC had to apply its decision to each of the thousands 
of identical cases, after deciding a constitutional controversy in one 
leading case. Therefore, it was “impossible to support that cases of this 
nature should continue congesting the judiciary and covering its several 
instances in the almost interminable succession of appeals at the parties 
disposition by the procedural legislation. No progress in legal thought will 
result from the judgment of those cases.”214 In addition, the costs to 
Brazilian society outweigh any justification for the argument because it 
would take ten or more years of litigation until a case is finally disposed 
of, causing perplexity and distrust about the judiciary.215  
By enacting Constitutional Amendment 45, Congress furnished the 
Súmula with a binding effect to promote stability and disburden the 
citizens from pleading their cases to the SFC in order to have its ruling 
applied. However, the binding effect of the Súmula, as established by 
Constitutional Amendment 45, is very limited and likely to be inefficient. 
It requires a minimum approval quorum of two-thirds of the SFC members 
and is limited to constitutional controversies that imply serious legal 
uncertainty and relevant multiplication of lawsuits of identical 
 214. Northfleet, supra note 210, at 133. 
 215. To use the mentioned Severance-Pay Fund controversy as an example, the several economic 
plans challenged were issued in 1987, 1989, 1990, and 1991. The SFC judgment was held in the year 
2000, and the public advocacy pleaded desistance of cases in 2002.  
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questions.216 As a result, controversies that do not have the potential to 
cause innumerous lawsuits will not have binding effect.  
One may argue that the binding effect of the Súmula is unnecessary 
because the majority of the Brazilian judges comply with the decisions of 
the SFC. It is true that most judges follow the jurisprudence of the SFC. 
Nevertheless, without the binding effect, the Brazilian judicial system 
would encourage losing parties to litigate in an attempt to reverse the 
unfavorable decision despite the unlikelihood of success, or to postpone 
the execution of unfavorable rulings or statutes. In fact, without such a 
binding effect, the judiciary loses credibility and appears to promote 
delayed justice. Albeit limited, the binding effect is an advancement in the 
promotion of steadfast justice and legal safety.  
B. General Repercussion for the Admission of Extraordinary Appeals 
The second main point of Constitutional Amendment 45 is the insertion 
of a requirement of admissibility of the extraordinary appeal, in which the 
appellant must demonstrate the general repercussions of the constitutional 
controversy raised in his case, authorizing the SFC to refuse the 
extraordinary appeal by two-thirds of its members.217 This new 
requirement is clearly inspired by the writ of certiorari of American law, 
by which the highest courts have discretionary power to render decisions 
only on cases involving legal questions of general importance. 
With this new mechanism, the SFC will be able to refuse to review 
inconsequential cases by two-thirds of its members, with criteria that 
Congress shall regulate by an ordinary statute. Although inspired by the 
experience of the United States Supreme Court, which has been very 
successful in controlling its docket,218 the Brazilian transplant contains 
substantial modifications that leave little to compare with its paradigm. 
The main purported objective of the device is to allow the SFC to exercise 
a discretionary rather than a mandatory judicial review by filtering which 
cases it will hear. The new system is, however, likely to become more 
complex and restrained since it will be regulated by statute. 
 216. C.F. amend. 45. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Even in the United States Supreme Court, the expansion of caseload can be noted: in the 
2002 term, the Court disposed of 8,342 cases and 1,152 remained on the docket, whereas in the 1990 
term, the Court disposed of 5,412 cases and 904 remained on the docket. Statistics, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
486, n.h (2003) (“The total number of cases disposed of by the Court is the highest since the Harvard 
Law Review began compiling these statistics during the 1948 Term.”). Id. For more information on the 
increase in the workload of the United States Supreme Court, see POSNER, supra note 75, at 74–75. 
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This requirement for admission of extraordinary appeals revives a 
previous “relevant federal issue” mechanism,219 by which the SFC, due to 
its increasingly growing caseload, filtered the cases brought before it 
during the period between 1975 and 1988 based on the relevance of the 
federal controversy.220 Because this earlier mechanism was implemented 
during the military dictatorship,221 it has been argued that discretionary 
jurisdiction based on the “general repercussion of the constitutional 
controversy” is an undemocratic and highly restrictive instrument because 
it prevents citizens from having access to the SFC.222 Despite the era in 
which it was implemented, this mechanism of a relevant federal issue was 
designed by a commission of Justices of the SFC to cope with an overly 
burdensome caseload, not by any authoritarian guidance.223  
Nevertheless, the requirement of “general repercussion of the 
constitutional controversy” for the admissibility of extraordinary appeals, 
as the Constitutional Amendment 45 establishes, is not an advancement 
that promotes steadfast justice and legal safety. Despite its admirable 
intentions of imposing a relevance test onto extraordinary appeals, this 
mechanism does not address the core problem of the caseload of the SFC, 
which has a docket of approximately 100,000 cases a year.224 In fact, the 
opposite effect will be obtained: because it requires the full Court to 
deliberate on whether to hear a case, this mechanism will burden the SFC 
instead of expediting the proceedings. Then, if the case is to be admitted, 
there must be another session in order to deliberate on the merits of the 
case. If the SFC has to decide a case, it is more efficient to do it fully 
without having a preliminary session on admissibility, which will only 
delay final decisions. Furthermore, it is important to note that repetitive 
 219. For more detailed historical information, see Nilson Vital Naves, Panorama dos Problemas 
no Poder Judiciário e suas Causas—O Supremo, o Superior e a Reforma [Panorama of the Problems 
in the Judiciary Power and its Causes—The Supreme Court, the Superior Court and the Reform], 
REVISTA CEJ n.13 (2001). 
 220. This mechanism was abolished with the advent of the Federal Constitution of 1988 due to the 
creation of the Superior Court of Justice, with jurisdiction on federal questions. 
 221. The right-wing military dictatorship in Brazil lasted from 1964 to 1984. See John P. 
Dickenson & Marshall C. Caitlin, Brazil, MICROSOFT ENCARTA ONLINE ENCYCLOPEDIA 2005, 
http://encarta.msn.com/text_761554342_1/Brazil.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2005). 
 222. See OAB: controle externo e quarenta deveriam ter âmbito ampliado [OAB: external control 
and quarantine should have their ambit extended] (Mar. 12, 2004), available at http://www.oab.org.br/ 
noticia.asp?id=1632 (last visited Oct. 14, 2005). 
 223. Justice Carlos Velloso, Speech at his Inauguration as President of the SFC (May 27, 1999), at 
http://gemini.stf.gov.br/netahtml/discursos/posseVelloso.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2005). 
 224. See supra note 58 and accompanying table. As seen in the table on the docket of the SFC, 
105,307 cases were presented before the Court in 2000, 110,771 in 2001, reaching 160,543 filings in 
2002, with a decrease in 2003 to 87,077 cases. Banco Nacional, supra note 1. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol5/iss1/5
p 99 Oliveira book pages.doc2/28/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
2006] REFORMING THE BRAZILIAN SUPREME FEDERAL COURT 145 
 
 
 
 
 
 
cases are analyzed by Justices’ staff and summarily disposed of by the 
Justices. As a matter of fact, the insertion of this new requirement of 
“general repercussion of the constitutional controversy” for the 
admissibility of extraordinary appeals further complicates the procedures 
before the SFC instead of rationalizing them.  
In addition, distinct from the American model, the SFC will not have 
full discretion on the decision-making process of refusing a case. Statutory 
law shall regulate how the SFC will proceed—probably inserting more 
requirements and procedures, which will overburden the Court with 
increasing complexity and foster delays.  
C. Additional Hypothesis of Extraordinary Appeal 
Surprisingly, Constitutional Amendment 45 adds one item to the 
existing three extraordinary bases for subject matter jurisdiction of the 
SFC. It provides that the SFC has jurisdiction to judge, on extraordinary 
appeal, cases decided in a sole or last instance, when the decision appealed 
declares valid a local law challenged against a federal law. This inclusion 
is based on the rationale that a dispute between a local law and federal law 
is a constitutional question since it is a conflict between members of the 
federation.225 
Nevertheless, I believe this to be a minor theme that need not be 
included among the attributions of the SFC. The Amendment encumbers 
the SFC with an extra jurisdictional basis that is not fundamental for the 
interests of the nation. Indeed, the augmentation of grounds of 
admissibility of extraordinary appeals is inconsistent with rationalizing 
and decreasing the number of cases brought before the SFC. The SFC 
should be judging the most important national cases, not minor disputes 
between municipal and federal law. 
VI. OTHER PROPOSALS TO REFORM THE BRAZILIAN SUPREME FEDERAL 
COURT 
A. Constitutional Court 
In response to the current deficiencies of the Brazilian system, an 
increasing number of jurists have advocated abolishing the United States-
inspired decentralized judicial review in favor of a European-inspired 
constitutional court in which only one court is authorized to ajudicate 
 225. Bandeira, supra note 197, at 7. 
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constitutional matters,226 like the German or Austrian Constitutional Court. 
It is not surprising that this idea has been so widely explored by scholars: 
the European model of constitutional adjudication is rapidly expanding 
throughout the world.227 The dockets of those courts are very impressive. 
In 2002, the Austrian Constitutional Court received 2,569 cases,228 and the 
German Federal Constitutional Court received 4,692 filings.229 In fact, a 
constitutional court as the unique organ lodged with power of declaring an 
enactment of Congress unconstitutional permits the important issues to be 
adjudicated within a reasonable amount of time.  
Polletti advocates transforming the SFC into a constitutional court 
whose decisions would have a binding effect, on the grounds that there has 
been a growing tendency of centralized judicial review in the Brazilian 
mixed system and some preoccupation about legal certainty.230 In his 
proposal, the argument of unconstitutionality raised in concrete disputes 
can only be certified to the constitutional court by courts of appeals, which 
would have the power to certify or defer the case to the constitutional 
court. 
Remodeling the SFC into a constitutional court in the European model 
is a very appealing proposal because centralization would improve legal 
certainty and reliability. Lessig characterizes the centralized and 
decentralized judicial review systems by the determinateness of the rules 
produced. 
For the cost of indeterminacy is magnified by decentralized judicial 
review: The more decentralized the system for applying rules, the 
more costly is any amount of indeterminacy. Costly, in just the 
sense that multiplying the rule appliers within a relatively 
 226. Ronaldo Rebello de Brito Polletti, Corte Constitucional Brasileira [Brazilian Constitutional 
Court], available at http://www.unb.br/fd/colunas_Prof/ronaldo_poletti/poletti_18.htm (last visited 
Oct. 14, 2005); Paulo San Martin, Presidente do STJ Pede Corte Constitucional [President of the STJ 
asks for Constitutional Court], AGENCIA ESTADO, Dec. 17, 2001, available at http://www.estadao. 
com.br/agestado/noticias/2001/set/17/280.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2005); Advogados Aprovam 
Criação de Corte Constitucional [Lawyers Approve Creation of Constitutional Court], REVISTA 
CONSULTOR JURÍDICO, Nov. 15, 2002, available at http://conjur.uol.com.br/textos/14932/ (last visited 
Oct. 14, 2005); OAB Apóia Sugestão de Mudança no Perfil do STF [OAB Supports Suggestion of 
Profile Change of the SFC], REVISTA CONSULTOR JURÍDICO, Sept. 18, 2001, available at 
http://conjur.uol.com.br/textos/6623/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2005). 
 227. Acknowledging the expansion of the European model of constitutional adjudication, see John 
E. Ferejohn, Constitutional Review in the Global Context, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 49 (2002–
2003). 
 228. See supra note 133 and accompanying table. 
 229. See supra note 145 and accompanying table. 
 230. See Polletti, supra note 226. 
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indeterminate legal culture will increase the incidence of 
inconsistency. And while for some issues, inconsistency will not 
much matter—for example, the inconsistency between two Fourth 
Amendment judgments of ‘reasonableness’—for some matters, 
inconsistency will be quite significant. In particular, when 
determining whether a law of Congress is constitutional, 
inconsistency among federal courts can be quite significant.231 
Even though there has been some tendency to concentrate judicial 
review at the SFC, and the problem of legal uncertainty has been 
addressed, the option of extinguishing the American model of 
decentralized judicial review seems unfeasible in Brazil’s current political 
and legal culture. As shown above, there has already been a lot of 
resistance to giving binding effect to the SFC rulings, owing to consensus 
about judges’ independence. Eradicating all judicial review power from 
judges outside the SFC is very unlikely to be accepted, not only by the 
juridical community but also by the population in general. Indeed, 
centralizing judicial review exclusively at the SFC would be a very 
reasonable proposal were it not so counter to Brazil’s current social and 
political context.  
B. Stay of Proceedings  
I defend giving the SFC power to issue provisional measures to stay the 
proceedings of identical cases in lower courts when the constitutional 
controversy has already been presented before the SFC. This is an efficient 
mechanism to apply when there is a multiplication of relevant lawsuits of 
identical concern, and has just been implemented by the SFC, although in 
a very limited ambit. The federal law 10,259 created small claims courts in 
the federal jurisdiction.232 This statute established the possibility of cases 
originating in the federal small claims courts to be brought directly to the 
SFC by extraordinary appeal.233 It also provided the SFC with powers to 
establish the proceedings to judge such extraordinary appeals.234 In 
December 2003, the SFC amended its Internal Rules to adopt the 
proceedings for the filing of extraordinary appeals that originated in 
 231. Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125 
(1996). 
 232. Decreto No. 10.259, de 12 de julio de 2001, D.O.U. de 12.7.2001. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. 
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federal small claims courts.235 The new rule states that the reporter may 
grant, ex officio or by request, a provisional measure to stay the 
proceedings until the SFC delivers its judgment on the subject matter.236 
As a matter of fact, this procedure rationalizes in advance the possibility of 
a steep increase in the caseload with extraordinary appeals coming from 
the federal small claims courts.  
One may argue that this mechanism could limit the full defense of the 
parties involved in the stayed cases. However, the SFC’s Internal Rules 
clarify that once a stay of proceedings in the circumstances explained is 
granted, people who are not parties to the case before the SFC may file a 
brief on the constitutional controversy within thirty days.237 Therefore, it 
grants the possibility for others to manifest their arguments and positions 
to the SFC by ensuring that whoever wants to present a written reasoning 
may do so.  
I advocate that this measure be extended to all extraordinary appeals, 
not only to those of federal small claims courts. It will rationalize the 
proceedings of the SFC by preventing repetitive lawsuits from reaching 
the SFC and piling up its docket with the same constitutional questions. 
Moreover, it will benefit the parties involved in identical cases by 
reducing the costs of their litigation. Mostly, it will reduce the delay in 
delivering final decisions of relevant cases because it contains a special 
and expedited procedure which places them in the docket with preference 
over all other cases, except habeas corpus lawsuits involving prisoners and 
writ of mandamus.238 Indeed, the extension of the possibility to stay the 
proceedings of identical cases in lower courts when the constitutional 
controversy has already been presented before the SFC will bring a 
crushing docket under control and reduce both the costs and the time of 
litigation. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The study of the different models of judicial review disclosed the 
remarkable difference in the caseloads of the Brazilian SFC and the courts 
analyzed. The Brazilian SFC is by far the most overloaded court of all. In 
2002, SFC’s filings reached the alarming figure of 160,453, while in the 
 235. Emenda Regimental no. 12 [Internal Rules Amendment no. 12], D.J.U. de 17.12.2003.  
 236. Appeals are distributed to the justices, who are then called the “reporter” of each case that is 
assigned to him or her.  
 237. See Emenda Regimental no. 12, supra note 235. 
 238. Id. 
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United States Supreme Court, cases on the docket amounted to 9,406.239 
As for Austria and Germany, the amount of filings before their respective 
Constitutional Courts attained 2,569 and 4,692 in 2002.240 In Italy, 536 
decisions were rendered in the same year.241 In the French Constitutional 
Council, the caseload for 2002 is emblematically low, amounting to 173 
cases only, due to the restricted standing for request of constitutional 
review.242 As a matter of fact, the contrast is striking. What mechanisms, if 
any, can be used to improve the Brazilian decentralized judicial review? 
To create an effective judiciary and disencumber the SFC of its 
immense number of claims, which overload the docket and which are 
irrelevant to such a pivotal institution for the safeguard of democracy, it is 
necessary to reform the decentralized judicial review in Brazil. Even 
though the American decentralized judicial review system is aimed at 
solving disputes inter partes, it is in fact exercised at the United States 
Supreme Court level mainly to solve objective disputes about the 
constitutionality of laws that concern not only the particular litigants, but 
society in general. As United States Chief Justice Vinson said: 
To remain effective, the Supreme Court must continue to decide 
only those cases which present questions whose resolution will have 
immediate importance far beyond the particular facts and parties 
involved. Those of you whose petitions for certiorari are granted by 
the Supreme Court will know, therefore, that you are, in a sense, 
prosecuting or defending class actions; that you represent not only 
your clients, but tremendously important principles, upon which are 
based the plans, hopes and aspirations of a great many people 
throughout the country.243  
Therefore, the decentralized judicial review exercised in “mass cases” 
in Brazil should not be regarded as individual case adjudication, with each 
single litigant making it all the way to the SFC as if it were a particular 
litigation. Instead, it should be viewed as an abstract judicial review 
deciding constitutional principles and rights that will be applied to 
litigants.244 
 239. The Supreme Court 2002 Term, 117 HARV. L. REV. 480 (2003). 
 240. See supra notes 133 and 145 and accompanying table. 
 241. See supra note 158 and accompanying table. 
 242. See supra note 173 and accompanying table. 
 243. Address of Chief Jutice Vinson before the American Bar Association, Sept. 7, 1949, 69 S. Ct. 
v, vi, in H.W. PERRY, JR., supra note 102, at 36. 
 244. Gilmar Ferreira Mendes, Remarks at the Study Group of Constitutional Law at the University 
of Brasilia (July 4, 2003). 
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Constitutional Amendment 45 is superficial and clearly inefficient at 
improving the functioning of the SFC. It seems rather contradictory that, 
given the mentioned need to diminish the SFC caseload, Constitutional 
Amendment 45 adds a new hypothesis of admissibility to the 
extraordinary appellate jurisdiction, that is to say, when the decision 
appealed declares valid a local law challenged against a federal law. This 
competence should be assigned to the Superior Court of Justice, which has 
jurisdiction over federal law disputes. What we can learn from this is that 
there exists a legal culture to take litigation up to the highest level. There 
are many reasons for it, such as stronger power at the federal level, as 
opposed to state level, and trust in the SFC as the organ that will render 
justice. Regardless the reasons, the present structure does not correspond 
to Brazilian society’s needs any longer, it is not cost-effective and more 
importantly causes distress and perplexity to all involved. Moreover, the 
creation of a requirement of general repercussion for the admission of 
extraordinary appeals, as it is currently designed by Constitutional 
Amendment 45, aggravates the entanglement of judicial proceedings and 
therefore supports delay and slowness of the judiciary.  
Therefore, it is necessary to change the current system by 
implementing functional and pragmatic mechanisms accordingly. The 
binding effect of the Súmula and stay of proceedings mechanism, as 
proven in this paper, are the best solutions to improve the decentralized 
judicial review and to make the judiciary system more effective in Brazil. 
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